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Abstract
Hardware support for security mechanisms such as authentication, cryptographic
protocols, digital rights management and hardware metering depend heavily on the
security of embedded secret keys. The current practice of embedding this key as
digital data in the Integrated Circuit (IC) weakens security because the keys can
be learned through attacks. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a recentlyproposed alternative to storing digital keys on the IC. A PUF leverages the inherent
manufacturing variations of an IC to define a random function. However, poor
performance under PUF quality criteria such as the level of randomness and reproducibility in the responses have detracted from their adoption and widespread use.
In this dissertation, I propose several ways to define a novel PUF using the Power
Distribution System (PDS) of an IC. First, I describe the hardware primitive and
test setup that is required to obtain the PUF responses. Then, I evaluate the analog
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PUF responses from silicon against standard PUF quality metrics in order to qualify
the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed PUF. I show that the analog PUFs exhibit very high levels of randomness and reproducibility, but are sensitive to changes
in temperature. Next, I propose extensions to our PUF that enable an exponential
number of Challenge/Response Pairs (CRPs) with respect to the number of hardware
resources, as well as yielding a marginal increase in the level of randomness. I also
use these same analog measurements from silicon to simulate an integrated implementation of the PUF that takes a digital challenge and returns a digital response.
I show that the integrated architecture also exhibits high levels of randomness and
reproducibility, and is also resistant to changes in temperature. Future work includes
designing and building a new IC that implements a more-powerful hardware primitive that will improve both the number and accuracy of the measurements, as well
as additional hardware that will allow the challenge and response generation to be
performed on-chip.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is widely accepted that the level of systematic and random process-induced variations in devices and interconnects is increasing as technologies are aggressively scaled
[1, 2], and the sources of lithographic and non-lithographic process variations continue to grow [3, 4, 5]. Process variations impact key electrical parameters, including
threshold voltage, resistance and capacitance, and have a significant impact on power
and delay. For advanced technologies, it becomes increasingly important to understand and track process variations in order to model the process and avoid delays in
time-to-market. In particular, new methods and test structures are needed to reduce
the manufacturing development and yield learning cycle times, and to support rapid
product and process debug. One technique is to include so-called “process monitors”
directly into production designs. I propose such a structure and show that it can be
used to understand interconnect resistance variations.
Many hardware security and trust mechanisms depend on the availability of secret keys that serve as a unique identity of each Integrated Circuit (IC). These keys
serve as the basis for many higher-level hardware security mechanisms such as identification, authentication, remote activation, hardware metering and/or encryption.

1
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Conventionally, secret keys are stored using fuses, flash or EPROM on the chip immediately after the IC is manufactured. For all mechanisms except identification, it
is critical that access to this key remains restricted to the hardware circuits on the
chip (i.e., remains secret). Unfortunately, since the keys are non-volatile, they are
subject to both invasive and non-invasive physical attacks by adversaries who may
be able to extract the key and thereby defeat the security mechanisms on which the
key is built. Also, once a digital key is known, it becomes possible to produce clone
chips that have the same key, which is as simple as programming the compromised
key into a new chip, in most cases.
Methods of utilizing the same process variations I mentioned earlier, which are
undesirable in the context of product quality, are sought to provide new hardware
primitives for applications to hardware security. A trend in the literature is to leverage existing methods of characterizing process variations and design new circuits
to serve these needs. The vulnerability of embedded digital keys to attacks can be
mitigated if the keys are derived from the inherent, statistically-random manufacturing variations of the IC instead of being stored in a ROM. Physical Unclonable
Functions (PUFs) embody structures that are sensitive to these silicon process variations can be used to generate keys which are a function of the specific random process
variations of the device [6]. The process variations in sub-micron technologies are
extremely difficult to control, and therefore creating two ICs that have the same
random function is extremely difficult. In other words, a PUF is easy to fabricate,
but practically impossible to duplicate. This is referred to as the “unclonable” property of PUFs, and is the hardware analog of a mathematical one-way function [7].
Typically, a PUF consists of a complex arrayed structure, each part of the structure
producing what I will call “physical property”. Whether it is the speed of a ring
oscillator or the delay of a path, the physical properties are in turn used to produce
a 1 or a 0, depending on the process variations specific to the device. Unlike the
ROM methods that I mentioned earlier, PUF keys are also “volatile”, which means
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that the key is not present without the circuit in a fully-functional state (i.e., intact
and powered on). Physical intrusions that involve de-processing the IC are considered to alter the function that the PUF originally had, and are therefore destructive
to the PUF. For these two reasons, the most-attractive way to attack a PUF is to
study its Challenge/Response Pairs (CRPs) and create a system that responds the
same way. This is known as the “spoofing attack”, where the attacker does not
produce a counterfeit chip, but rather masquerades as a known chip over a network
or other communication medium. The best defense against spoofing is to increase
both the number and unpredictability of the CRPs. Since PUFs are “unclonable”
and “volatile”, they have the potential to revolutionize next-generation security and
trust infrastructures in ICs.
However, since real PUFs are not ideal, other properties such as randomness and
reproducibility also need to be considered. Randomness relates to the uniqueness of
the function between ICs and specifies the probability that the function will have
the same mapping on different ICs. Randomness is a function of the number of
properties, the size of the CRPs and the statistical independence of the responses.
Ideally, each bit in each response is like a fair coin and is a 0 exactly half of the time
and a 1 the other half. In practice, the bits tend to be a biased toward 0 or 1, and
the responses are somewhat dependent. Reproducibility relates to the integrity of
the function under different environmental variations. Ideally, the response is always
the same, but in practice the bits can flip and this has to be taken into account.
More quality metrics are explained later, in Section 2.3. PUFs can be classified
by the type of components that affect their function; e.g., MOSFETs, metal wires,
insulator dielectric, etc. Each of these components is affected by process variations,
which detract from the reproducibility of the PUF. However, some components are
more sensitive than others. For example, the effect of ambient temperature on FET
saturation current is quadratic, RO frequency (or inversely, path delay) is linear, and
leakage current is exponential.
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Typically, a PUF circuit includes an interface for retrieving a unique set of response vectors {R1 , R2 , . . . , Rn } from a variety of different challenge vectors {C1 ,
C2 , . . . Cm }. This interface serves two functions: (1) the PUF functions more like a
RAM rather than a register, and (2) the underlying physical properties that define
the function can be hidden. More formally, a PUF can be defined as a function
R = f (C),

f : Bn → Bm ,

(1.1)

where the challenge C is n bits and the response R is m bits. Typically, n = m,
and the number of hardware resources p is at least n × m. Since there is a response
for each challenge, there are 2n responses, and therefore the number of responses is
exponential to the number of hardware resources. The total number of response bits
is therefore m2n . Having an exponential number of challenges is ideal since cloning
or spoofing then requires matching a large number of CRPs, which is intractable for
large n.
A common method of using these physical properties to produce a bit is to pair
two identical structures together and use the difference between them. I refer to
this type of implementation as “differential”. It is effective at balancing the process
variations in order to produce an approximately-equal number of 1’s and 0’s. Using a
“differential” method also means that the resulting bits are resistant to environmental
variations that have a common-mode effect on the properties. For example, if two
ring oscillator frequencies are 43MHz and 45MHz at one temperature, but increase to
44MHz and 47MHz at another temperature, then the relative difference is preserved
and hence is resistant to changes in temperature. I will revisit this concept later in
the discussion of the integrated PUF architecture, which is differential.
In this dissertation, I present the theory of a new PUF that is defined using resistance variations in Power Distribution System (PDS) (or power grid) of an IC.
In Chapter 3, I present techniques for measuring resistance variations in the PDS
that is enabled by an embedded primitive and external instrumentation. Then in
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Chapter 4, I show that these same resistances which are useful for understanding
process variations can be used to define a PUF and I evaluate the potency of the
PUF to distinguish one IC from one another using the metric of the probability of
aliasing. In Chapter 5, I describe extensions of this PUF that increase the number
of CRPs from linear to exponential and I apply several other quality metrics that
characterize the performance and security of the PUF. However, in order for a PUF
to be used as a low-level primitive in hardware security applications, it needs to be
integrated on-chip. To solve this problem, Chapter 4 also presents an architecture
that implements the PUF on-chip and has digital input and output. In Chapters 5
and 6, I show that this architecture is also a viable PUF implementation. In Chapter
6, the previous analysis is repeated with temperature control and the temperature
sensitivity of the various PUF implementations is evaluated. In Chapter 7, I present
plans for implementing the integrated architecture, as well as extensions to the hardware primitive that should make it both more powerful and more accurate. Chapter
8 reviews the theory and presents reflections on what I learned.

5

Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides a discussion of previous work in the areas of studying process
variation in Section 2.1, building hardware security with PUFs in Section 2.2 and
quality metrics for PUFs in Section 2.3. This builds upon the overview and definitions
set forth in Chapter 1.

2.1

PDS Variation Characterization

There is a wide spectrum of published works on measuring and analyzing process
variations. The techniques proposed in [8, 9] make use of ring oscillators and other
types of test structures to track variations in Front End-of-Line (FEOL) parameters
or single wire/via variations in Back End-of-Line (BEOL) parameters. For example, the authors of [8] propose a logic characterization vehicle to investigate the
yield and performance impact of process variations. The authors of [10] proposed
digitally-configurable ring oscillators to measure the effects of process variations on
performance. A framework for the statistical design of experiments to measure the
variance in critical dimensions of gate poly-silicon is proposed in [11]. A test struc-
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ture to measure cell-to-cell delay mismatch due to process variations is proposed
in [12], and another for the statistical characterization of local device mismatches is
proposed in [13]. The authors of [14] propose a test structure that enables the extraction of spatial- and layout-dependent variations in both transistor and interconnect
structures.
The techniques proposed in [9, 15, 16, 17, 18] focus on the measurement and analysis of resistance variations, but again, the work is limited to isolated test structures
(wires, vias, etc.). For example, the authors of [15] and [16] propose test structures
for characterizing wire resistance mismatch. Resistance measurement and analysis
techniques for line width and step variation are described in [17] and [18]. In [9],
dishing and erosion in non-ideal copper Chemical-Mechanical Planarization (CMP)
is described, and dummy feature insertion techniques are proposed to reduce its impact on resistance variations. To my knowledge, [19] was the first time a technique
has been proposed for measuring resistance variations in the PDS.
In [19], we proposed a test infrastructure that supports measurement of the PDS
resistance characteristics for tracking BEOL process variations. The method enables
a fast, first-order analysis of metal resistivity, and facilitates the identification of process problems. Since it is designed as a minimal augmentation to an existing design,
it also serves to enable the resistance characteristics of the PDS to be evaluated for
validation purposes, and provides meaningful data in the context of an actual circuit
design, as opposed to the use of isolated test structures. This method is explained
in Chapter 3.

2.2

Physical Unclonable Functions

Although the topic is relatively new, there is also a broad spectrum of work on PUFs
(sometimes called Physical Unknown Functions[20], or Physical Random Functions
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[21]), that can be classified by their technique (Section 2.2.2) and its application
(Section 2.2.1).

2.2.1

Applications

Many applications of PUFs have been proposed including IC identification [22], labeling RFID tags, addressing wireless sensor nodes, IC process quality control [23],
providing unique keys for encryption [24], IP protection on FPGA’s [25, 26], authentication via challenge-response protocols [21, 27], and remote service and feature
activation [28].
The authors of [29, 21, 22, 30] explain that, if an IC was able to provide its own
unique physical identifier, then this signature could be used in the same way that
human fingerprints are. That is, the signatures of known (and authorized) ICs could
be collected, and the IC could output its signature later in the field. This could be
used for tracking purposes, Return Materials Authorization (RMA), and detection
of hardware piracy (e.g., counterfeit ICs, over-manufacturing, etc.).
Authentication is a mechanism by which the IC is identified via a challengeresponse protocol. The term authentication means that the identity of the response
is also verified. As the authors of [21, 31, 27] explain, a chip ID alone is not sufficient
for authentication, since the response is always the same and can be reproduced.
Instead, a secret key is embedded that enables the IC to generate a unique response
to a challenge, which is generated each time. That way, so long as the key is secret,
the authentication mechanism is not vulnerable to spoofing.
The authors of [24, 32] propose that PUFs be used to integrate secret keys for the
use in cryptography. The author of [20] explains that, just as algorithmic one-way
functions are critical to cryptography in software, PUFs are useful to cryptography
in hardware. Specifically, an ideal PUF has the property that it is easy to generate a
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response, but difficult to predict one, and PUFs are therefore inherently asymmetric.
Intellectual Property (IP) protection in FPGAs is presented as a major problem
in [33, 24, 26, 34]. FPGA IP are bit streams that describe large functional blocks
(like a microprocessor) and are licensed to be used to build larger designs or are complete designs themselves. These bit streams are generally stored in SRAMs, which
makes them vulnerable to copying since the SRAM can be read directly. Therefore,
methods are sought to stop that bit stream from working on FPGAs other than those
authorized. The authors of [24] propose new protocols for the IP protection problem
on FPGAs, that are based on public-key cryptography, and exploit PUFs derived
from SRAM start-up conditions.
The authors of [28, 35] describe remote activation schemes that enable IC designers to lock each IC either once or at every start-up and then to enable it remotely. In
[28], their objectives were realized by adding a few states to the finite state machine
(FSM) of a design and by adding control signals that are a function of the unique
IDs. In effect, the hardware “locks up” waiting for an activation code specific to
that IC. This enables the designer, who knows the unique internal control signals, to
issue a unique activation code that unlocks only that IC. This mechanism offers protection against unauthorized use of Intellectual Property (IP) and hardware piracy
(the illegal manufacturing of ICs).

2.2.2

Techniques

Various PUF techniques have been proposed, including mismatched delay-lines [36,
37, 21, 31, 27] and Ring Oscillators (ROs) [38, 34], exploiting inherent SRAM poweron patterns [26, 24], MOS device mismatch [29, 22, 38, 23, 34] and input-dependent
leakage patterns [39].
The authors of [26] proposed that the start-up values of embedded SRAM mem-
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ories be used to create a PUF, especially in FPGAs where the start-up values can
be accessed. When first powered on, SRAM memories are in an unstable state. The
mis-match of the transistors composing the SRAM cells dictate the final start-up
value of a 0 or a 1. Hence, a PUF can be constructed by dedicating some of the
intrinsic SRAM memories (they used 64 bits) to be read only.
The authors of [36, 37, 21, 27] propose using delay properties of ICs for identification. Delay-based approaches involve mismatch in both MOS devices and interconnects. In [36], the authors apply the relative mismatch of delay lines, which
are dependent on random process parameters, to generating unique signatures. The
authors of [37] propose integrating the delay fingerprint hardware into the functional
design, which enables identification and Trojan circuit detection.
The authors of [22] propose that the relative current-driving capabilities of transistors, which are a function of random polysilicon crystal formations, be exploited.
To utilize these random formations, they proposed that MOSFET device mismatches
be detected by comparing their current against a reference current. The resulting
ones and zeros form the fingerprint (PUF). The authors of [29] propose that the
MOSFET threshold voltages, which are a function of the random placement of impurity dopant atoms, be exploited. Frequently, a ROM-like structure is used that
allows the PUF to be compact and easily read.
In [40], we proposed two PUFs which are described in Chapter 4. One PUF
utilizes the voltage drop across the power grid due to a current being drawn through
the grid. We call this the voltage drop PUF and it is a function of both metal
resistance and transistors. The second PUF utilizes the global current in order to
measure the equivalent resistance of the power grid. We call this the equivalent
resistance PUF and it is a function of only the power grid, which is a function of
specific metal resistances. This is an attractive property because the resistance of the
power grid is marginally affected by environmental variations. In fact, resistance is a
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linear function of temperature, and temperature is the only environmental parameter
that directly affects metal resistance. Moreover, the distributed nature of the power
grid makes it more prone to both random and systematic process variation effects,
thereby decreasing its collision probability with other chips. Another significant
advantage of using the power grid as a PUF is that it is an existing, distributed
resource in every design. Therefore, the overhead of the power grid PUF is limited
to the challenge/response circuitry which is well below 1% of the chip area. To our
knowledge, this was the first time that a PDS measurement architecture has been
proposed as a PUF.

2.3

PUF Metrics

Many metrics for PUFs have been established to assess their quality and security
[41]. The major categories of metrics are predictability, reverse-engineering, collision
and sensitivity, and are defined as follows.
The first type of vulnerability is predictability. In the context of pseudo-random
number generators, if the generator being used is known, and the last output is
known, then an attacker can accurately compute subsequent outputs. A similar
attack is considered in the context of PUFs whereby an attacker learns several CRPs
and tries to model unknown responses. The susceptibility of the PUF to this type of
attack is related to how unique the responses are from one another. Three metrics for
qualifying this are the single bit probability P (Ri = 0, 1), the conditional probability
P (Ri = 0, 1|Rj = 0, 1) and the Hamming distances between responses. Following is
a description of these three metrics.
The single bit probability metric is the probability of response bit i, under all
possible challenges, being a zero or a one. In the degenerate case, the output bits
are zeros and ones, but are invariant under different challenges. In the ideal case,
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P (Ri = 0) = P (Ri = 1) =

1
2

and each output bit is like a flip of a coin for a given IC

and a given challenge. The conditional probability metric addresses the independence
between response bits. In the degenerate case, all of the output bits are the exactly
the same (a zero or a one), but they can still all change under different challenges.
In the ideal case, the result of flipping any bit in the challenge is a random set of half
of the bits flipping in the response. As shown in [41], the effect of different challenge
bits is not always the same; some challenge bits can affect the output more than
others, and this is an artifact of the architecture. The Hamming distance between
responses is another, more systematic method of addressing the same issue as the
conditional probability, and is more amenable to computational analysis.
The second type of vulnerability is susceptibility to reverse-engineering. This
vulnerability is a matter of how accurately the PUF can be modelled given a set of
CRPs. In the ideal case, each m-bit response is independent from the rest. In that
case, knowing all but one response does not increase the accuracy of guessing that
last response; it still contains new information. For example, a plot of the modeling
accuracy versus the number of CRPs tends to start at near zero (a guess) and then
approach 100% with an exponential decay. To resist this weakness, the PUF circuit
should obfuscate the physical properties of the system well so that the responses
are highly “non-linear” or uncorrelated to the challenge. An example PUF interface
that is highly “linear” would be simply XORing the n-bit input with n physical
properties to produce the output. This would score very poorly against this metric.
As mentioned earlier, other forms of reverse-engineering are considered destructive
and therefore the original function is destroyed during the attack.
The third metric for PUFs is collision vulnerability. The previous metrics have
only considered the set of responses from a single IC. Collision vulnerability considers
how differentiable or distinguishable ICs are to one another. This is the essence
of the power of the PUF to separate ICs, and is easily quantified by a collision
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probability—there is one collision in every x ICs. In the ideal case, each IC is as
different as possible from one another; in this case, we use the upper bound on the
number of m-bit binary strings and we say that a PUF is resistant to collision attacks
if the probability of collision approaches one in every 2m ICs. In the degenerate case,
each IC has 2n possibly-distinct responses, but those responses are identical from
IC to IC. Realities that detract from are systematic similarities that manifest in
the layout-level of the PUF circuitry. These effects cause each IC to tend to have a
similar response, detracting from the PUFs utility.
The last metric used to evaluate PUFs is the sensitivity of the PUF to environmental variations. Ideally, the response of a PUF to a given challenge is invariant
over time and under different operating conditions such as temperate and supply
voltage level. Unfortunately, these environmental variations tend to affect the PUF
and cause the response to change. Depending on the components involved, some
implementations are more sensitive than others. For example, the effect of ambient
temperature on FET saturation current is quadratic, RO frequency (or, inversely,
path delay) is linear, and leakage current is exponential.
A common approach to overcoming environmental variations in the physical quantities being measured is to pair them together so that they vary in the same way, and
their differential persists even under different conditions. Another way to solve this
problem is to use error-correcting codes. A designer would choose the complexity
of the PUF (the number of physical properties) in order to achieve the desired level
of collision, and then add an extra, say 15% in order to account for environmental
variations. Then, in practice, a response would be recorded and then later the IC
would give the same response, and one could use the Hamming distance between
those responses to see if they are within some distance from one another.

13

Chapter 3
PDS Characterization
This chapter is organized into several sections, following the structure of our paper
[19]. First, the architecture of the power grid, the on-chip support circuitry and the
experiment setup are described in Section 3.1. Next, a model for the power grid
is developed and validated with experimental data in Section 3.2. The experimental procedure for conducting PDS resistance measurements is given in Section 3.3.
Finally, the simultaneous equations that need to be solved to obtain the resistance
components of the PDS are described in Section 3.4. Finally, the resolution limits of
our measurements are discussed in Section 3.5.
The results reported in this paper are derived from chips fabricated in a 65nm
technology from IBM, and are therefore meaningful to state-of-the-art practices.
However, the PDS measured in the hardware experiments was not designed to mindi
imize ohmic IR and inductive L dt
voltage drops, and from this perspective it does

not conform to a typical PDS of a commercial product. In particular, the resistances
of many of the PDS components of our test chips are larger—some by more than
an order of magnitude—than those found in commercial chips. In order to validate
our technique for commercial applications, we supplement our test chip results with
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Figure 3.1: Power grid architecture

data from a simulation model that is representative of commercial designs.

3.1

PDS Architecture

A high-level representation of the power grid architecture used in the simulation
and hardware experiments is shown in Figure 3.1. The bottom portion shows that
adjacent metal layers are routed at right angles to each other in a mesh configuration
with vias between the intersections. The ground (GND) grid, which is not shown,
is interleaved with the power grid and routed in a similar fashion. Both grids are
routed across the ten metal layers available in the 65 nm process. The width of the
wires and the granularity of the mesh vary across the metal layers. In particular,
the widths of the lower metal tracks are smaller and the granularity is finer than the
widths and granularity of the metal wires in the upper layers. This feature of the
power grid is typical of commercial designs [42].
The power grid is connected to a set of six C4s or PP in the top metal layer. The
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Figure 3.2: Instrumentation setup

Power Ports (PPs) are shown as ovals in the figure and are labeled PP00 through
PP12 . Commercial power grids can have hundreds of such PPs. The C4s enable
the power grid to be connected to the power supply, either through a membranestyle probe card (during wafer probe) or through the package wiring. The finite
resistances of PP connections are represented as series resistances RPxy (where x, y
are indices), in Figure 3.1. The measurement technique proposed in this work requires
the measurement of branch currents through each of the PPs. For packaged chips,
the PPs are typically wired into a power plane(s) within the package before being
routed off-package through the power pins. Therefore, it is not possible to apply
our technique directly to packaged parts without additional on-chip support circuits
(beyond those described herein). We assume in the remainder of the paper that our
technique is applied at wafer probe, where it is possible to access the PPs directly.
In our test setup, we emulate a wafer probe environment in our packaged chips
by dedicating a separate package pin for each of the six PPs. The details of the
test setup are shown in Figure 3.2. The package pins that are connected to the
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Figure 3.3: Block diagram of the test structure (a) and details of the RMC (b)

PPs are routed onto a PCB to a set of six mechanical, low-resistance switches. The
switches can be configured in a left or right position. The left and right outputs of
the switches each connect to a common wire that is routed to the Global Current
Source Meter (GCSM) and Local Current Ammeter (LCA), respectively, as shown
in the figure.
The GCSM provides 0.9 V to the PDS and can measure current with a precision
of approximately 300 nA. The LCA is wired in series between the switches and the
GCSM and allows measurement of the individual PP (local) currents at the same level
of precision. For example, the switch configuration in Figure 3.2 allows measurement
of the local PP00 current I00 , as well as the global current.
In addition to branch currents, our technique to measure resistance also requires
on-chip voltage measurements. The voltage is measured in our experiments using an
additional (test-only) pin that is connected internally to a globally-routed VoltageSense Wire (VSW). A voltmeter is connected to this pin off-chip, as shown in Figure
3.2.
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The last element of the test infrastructure is shown along the bottom of Figure 3.2
and in more detail in Figure 3.3. A RMC is inserted under each of the six C4s. The
RMC consists of stimulus transistors, a voltage-sense transistor and a set of three
scan flip-flops (SFFs). The outputs of the SFFs connect to the gates of the three
transistors1 as shown in Figure 3.3(b). The stimulus transistors provide a controlled
stimulus—that is, a short between the power and ground grid—when the states of
the SFF1 and SFF2 are set to 0. The voltage on the Metal 1 (bottom) layer of the
power grid is measured using the voltage-sense transistor, which is enabled when a
0 is placed in SFF3 .

3.2

Power Grid Equivalent Circuit Model

The equivalent resistance models shown for the power grid in Figure 3.4(a), 3.4(b)
and 3.4(c) were deduced from SPICE DC simulation data collected from a resistance
model of the test chip’s power grid. The power grid resistances, given as Rx , Ry
and Rz , represent the equivalent resistance of an entire mesh of resistors in the
simulation model. The resistances Rp1 and Rp2 represent the external connection or
probe resistances to the power grid.
The models shown in Figures 3.4(a) and 3.4(b) are referred to as 1-port experiments because only one PP is connected to the power supply—the others are left
floating. Similarly, the configuration in 3.4(c) is called a 2-port experiment. The
stimulus in each configuration is provided by RMC1 , which is depicted as a current
source. The currents and voltage drops are labeled symbolically for each of the three
experiments, e.g. I1 and V1 .
1 The

stimulus as shown in our test structures was designed to serve other purposes
beyond those described in this paper. A more efficient implementation would use only the
p-channel transistor portion of the series transistor pair.
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Figure 3.4: 1-port and 2-port power-up schemes to determine appropriate resistance
model. Since the stimulus transistors can be modeled as a current source with a
known voltage, the non-linearity and process variations inherent to the transistors
do not affect the test.

Our objective is to verify that the equivalent resistance models of Figure 3.4 are
valid representations of the actual PDS. Assuming they are valid, then
Rpds,12 =

1
Rp1 +Rx

1
+

1
Rp2 +Ry

+ Rz =

1
Rpds,1 −Rz

1
+

1
Rpds,2 −Rz

+ Rz

(3.1)

expresses the relationship between the equivalent resistances in the three models
Rpds,1 , Rpds,2 and Rpds,12 . Each of these is defined as Vi /Ii where Vi is the voltage
drop and Ii is the total current, for i = 1, 2 or 12 (see dashed boxes in Figure 3.4).
For example, the first element on the right side of the equation gives the parallel
resistance of the upper network in Figure 3.4(c), expressed using the equivalent
resistances in Figures 3.4(a) and 3.4(b). The second element on the right side of
the equation accounts for the shared resistance Rz that is in series with the parallel
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network.
As mentioned earlier, we confirmed these models using a numerical analysis of
data collected from a simulation model and from one of the 65 nm test chips. The
values of the equivalent resistances that were computed are presented in Table 3.1,
and compared with the values measured from hardware. Columns two, three and four
give the equivalent resistances computed using data from the configurations shown in
Figures 3.4(a), 3.4(b) and 3.4(c), respectively. The measured value of Rpds,12 agrees
with the value predicted by Eq. 3.1. The values of Rz in the fifth column are derived
by solving Eq. 3.1 for Rz .

Simulation
Hardware

Rpds,1
14.05 Ω
14.24 Ω

Rpds,2
20.04 Ω
20.02 Ω

Rpds,12
12.10 Ω
12.27 Ω

Rz
8.18 Ω
8.38 Ω

Rx
0.63 Ω
0.62 Ω

Rz /(Rx + Rz )
92.9%
93.1%

Table 3.1: Numerical analysis of 1-port and 2-port simulation and hardware experiments.

The series resistance combinations Rp1 + Rx and Rp2 + Ry are represented by
the terms in the denominator of Eq. 3.1, as indicated before, but the three tests as
shown in Figure 3.4 are not sufficient to determine the individual values (e.g., Rp1
and Rx ). We were able to derive the individual values by creating a simulation model
that closely approximates one of our test chips2 The estimated values for Rp1 and
Rp2 derived in this fashion are 5.24 Ω and 11.71 Ω, respectively.
The estimated values of Rx and Ry are easily obtained once Rp1 and Rp2 are
known. The Rx values are given in the sixth column of Table 3.1 (the Ry values
are similar). When compared with the Rz values in the fifth column, it is clear that
Rx is smaller by more than an order of magnitude. Given that Rx and Rz are both
grid equivalent resistances, this data indicates that the paths followed by the branch
2 The

actual values can be measured by adding voltage observe points in the PDS’s top
metal layer directly beneath the C4s, as discussed later.
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currents I12x and I12y from Figure 3.4(c) are common over a large fraction of the
vertical resistance of the power grid. The last column in the table gives the fraction
of common resistance at nearly 93%. The wire characteristics described for the power
grid in Section 3.1 support this result. There, we disclosed that the resistance of the
wires in the upper layers of the power grid is smaller than that of the wires in the
lower layers.
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Figure 3.5: Top and bottom voltage profile of 2-port simulation experiment of
the test chip grid.
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Figure 3.6: Top and bottom voltage profile of 6-port simulation experiment of a
commercial grid

Our simulation model enabled a more detailed investigation of the spatial distribution of currents through the power grid. Figure 3.5 shows a 3-D voltage profile for
the 2-port simulation model with RMC00 enabled (see Figure 3.4(a)). The voltage
potential surfaces of both the top-most metal layer and bottom-most metal layer are
superimposed. For most of the x-y dimension of the grid, the top and bottom surface
potentials are nearly identical, indicating that current from remote PPs, e.g. PP01 ,
remains in the top portion of the grid until reaching the potential well near PP00 . At
this point, the branch currents from other PPs combine and traverse the majority of
the vertical dimension together. This type of current behavior will tend to amplify
the magnitude of local IR drops.
We performed another simulation on our power grid with much smaller via and
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wire resistance-per-square resistances to determine how the values in Table 3.1 would
change for a PDS that better represents a commercial design. The Rp s were also
reduced by a factor of twenty to model the contact resistance of a typical probe card.
The voltage profile of this grid is shown in Figure 3.6 and its resistance characteristics
are given in Table 3.2. Rpds,00 is the equivalent resistance measured with RMC00
enabled. It is a factor of eight times smaller than the value in the second column of
Table 3.1. The lower resistances of the metal wires in this model are also reflected
in columns three and four. However, the fraction in column five is still significant
at 80.6%, and therefore, the lower resistance of this grid only partially explains the
current distribution characteristics. We determined using other grid configurations
that the most significant factor affecting this fraction is the overall architecture of
the Power Grid (PG). For example, PGs configured such that each layer has the
same resistance produce a fraction of 50%.

Simulation

Rpds,00
1.74 Ω

Rz
1.47 Ω

Rx
0.35 Ω

Rz /(Rx + Rz )
80.6%

Table 3.2: Numerical analysis of 6-port simulations of a low-resistance PDS.

3.3
0.9V

PDS Resistance Measurement Procedure
PPa
+
+
Rpa
Rpva
Va

I sa

I a0

I a1

PPb

0.9V

Rpb
I as1 I
as2

x

Rha

I asn Rpvb

PPa
+
-

I b1

Rpa
I bs1

Rpva
x

y

I b0

I bs2

PPb
I bsn
y

Rhb

+

Rpb

Rpvb

Vb

Rvb

Rva

I sb

RMCa

Figure 3.7: Complete model: 1st test.

RMCb

Figure 3.8: Complete model: 2nd test.
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Figure 3.9: Complete model: 3rd test.

One of our goals is to define a set of tests that provide data to solve for six
unknown resistances in the PDS. The three tests and corresponding equivalent circuit
models are shown in Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9. The six resistances, two of which are
the sum of two series resistances, are labeled Rpv,a = Rp,a + x, Rv,a , Rpv,b = Rp,b + y,
Rv,b , Rh,a and Rh,b , where ’p’ indicates probe, ’v’ denotes vertical and ’h’ denotes
horizontal. As noted in the previous section, is not possible to separate the series
resistances, e.g. Rp,a + x, unless capability is added to the infrastructure to allow
the voltage to be sensed at the point where the C4 attaches to the power grid.
According to the models, Rha , Rhb and Rhab identify the same resistance and
therefore represent only a single unknown. From simulation experiments, we find
there are actually small differences in these resistances. The equations that we
present later treat Rha and Rhb in a special way and as separate variables. The
values derived from our equations represent a good estimate of Rha , Rhb and Rhab .
Each test provides two independent equations, enabling values to be derived for
the six resistances from the solution to a system of simultaneous equations (to be
described). The third test shown in Figure 3.9 requires enabling both RMCa and
RMCb and measuring two voltages, Vca and Vcb . Under the proposed infrastructure,
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it is necessary to measure each of these sequentially by enabling the appropriate
voltage sense transistor.
The current and voltages shown in Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 are calibrated to
remove the impact of leakage currents. This is an important step to obtaining a
meaningful result in modern technologies, given the trend of increasing background
leakage currents. Calibration is carried out by measuring the currents and voltages,
as given in Figures 3.7 and 3.8, and under a forth configuration in which both RMCa
and RMCb are disabled. These leakage currents are subtracted from the values
measured under the three tests.

3.3.1

Branch Current Calculation

Unlike the 1-port and 2-port experiments shown earlier, the multi-port scheme introduces a set of additional currents, such as those labeled Ias1 , Ias2 through Iasn
in Figure 3.7. These currents originate from the PPs distributed across the PG.
The total current, e.g. Isa in Figure 3.7, includes their contribution. Although it is
straightforward to compute these supplementary currents, only the total current is
needed in the equations given in the next section3 .
The only currents that cannot be measured individually are the stimulus currents,
0
0
Isa
and Isb
, shown in Figure 3.9. They are labeled using the prime symbol because

they are related to the ‘unprimed’ values measured under the first and second tests.
Under ideal conditions, the sum of current, Isa + Isb , measured under the first and
0
0
second tests, is equivalent to Isa
+ Isb
(or Isc ). However, the p-channel stimulus

transistors are not ideal current sources, and the small change in VDS introduced by
having both RMCa and RMCb enabled reduces their magnitudes.
3 In

our experiments, we compute the total current as the sum of the calibrated power
port currents.
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In our experiments, the difference is small—at most a couple µAs—and can be
derived using

∆Is = Isa + Isb − Isc

(3.2)

where the constituent currents (right-hand side of the equation) are the total currents measured under each of the three tests. From simulation experiments, we
determined that the reduction in current given by ∆Is splits nearly equally across
both RMCa and RMCb in the third test. This holds under the condition that the
resistance characteristics of the PDS as measured from either stimulus location are
similar—a reasonable assumption given the uniform architecture of the power grid.
We examined a variety of resistance configurations and found that the magnitudes
0
0
and Isb
are well approximated using
of Isa

∆Is
2
∆Is
= Isb −
.
2

0
Isa
= Isa −

(3.3)

0
Isb

(3.4)

0
The supplemental currents, e.g. Ias1
, as well as the current across Rhab , e.g. Ih ,

as shown in Figure 3.9, can also be derived but are not needed to solve the set of
equations given in the next section.
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3.4

PDS Resistance Equations

The first four equations are derived from the models shown in Figures 3.7, 3.8 and
3.9 using Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law (KVL).
Va = Ia0 · Rpva + Isa · Rva

(3.5)

0
· Rva
Vca = Ic0 · Rpva + Isa

(3.6)

Vb = Ib1 · Rpvb + Isb · Rvb

(3.7)

0
Vcb = Ic1 · Rpvb + Isb
· Rvb

(3.8)

Equations 3.5 through 3.8 yield values for Rpva , Rva , Rpvb and Rvb directly if solved
as a set of simultaneous equations.

3.4.1

Horizontal Resistance Analysis

The equations that we use to compute values for Rha and Rhb , Equations 3.9 and
3.10, are not consistent with KVL applied to the models in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. In
particular, Rha is multiplied by the total current Isa , in contrast to the model, which
indicates the multiplier should be the branch current Ia1 .
Va = Ia1 · Rpvb + Isa (Rha + Rva )

(3.9)

Vb = Ib0 · Rpva + Isb (Rhb + Rvb )

(3.10)

Rh = Rha + Rhb

(3.11)

Given that Ia1 is strictly less than Isa , the values obtained for Rha and Rhb using
Equations 3.9 and 3.10 underestimate the actual values. Interestingly, the sum of Rha
and Rhb using these equations produces a good estimate of their actual value, under
the assumption that Rha is nearly equal to Rhb , as we noted above, is reasonable.
We use Rh to represent the sum as given by Equation 3.11
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Figure 3.10: Power schemes investigated

To demonstrate that these equations provide a better estimate of the Rh resistances over those derived using KVL, which are

Va = Ia1 (Rpvb + Rha ) + Isa · Rva

(3.12)

Vb = Ib0 (Rpva + Rhb ) + Isb · Rvb ,

(3.13)

we conducted a sequence of experiments using a variety of PP configurations. The
criteria that we used to determine the best analytical form is based on the consistency
of the results across the different PP configurations. Intuitively, the values computed
for the six horizontal resistances should remain consistent, independent of the powerup scheme. However, this is not the case for Rha and Rhb if Equations 3.12 and 3.13
are used.
We computed the values of the six resistances using hardware data from each
of the PP configurations shown in Figure 3.10. The upper portion of the figure
shows four 2-port experiments while the bottom portion shows a 4-port and a 6-port
experiment. For each of the four 2-port experiments, the three tests described in
Section 3.3 were applied using a pair of RMCs located underneath the labeled PPs.
These twelve tests were also applied to the 4-port and 6-port configurations.
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Figure 3.11: Rpv and Rv results under different power-up configurations

We first applied Equations 3.5 through 3.8 to derive values for each pair of Rpv
and Rv under each of these configurations. For example, the resistances computed
under the left-most 2-port configuration are Rpv00 , Rpv01 , Rv00 and Rv01 , labeled
according to the PP coordinate space shown in Figure 3.10. The overlap of the PPs
across the 2-port configurations allowed each of the four distinct Rpv and Rv pairs
to be computed twice, yielding a total of eight values. The same held true for the 4port and 6-port experiments. The results are shown in Figure 3.11 as a set of curves.
The two values computed for each variable are adjacent in the curves to illustrate
that they are similar, as expected. The three curves for the 2-port, 4-port and 6-port
experiments are superimposed to illustrate that there exists strong agreement among
the computed values, independent of the PP configuration scheme. We conclude that
Equations 3.5 through 3.8 give the appropriate analytical form for these resistances.
We then carried out this analysis on Rha and Rhb using Equations 3.12 and 3.13.
The results are shown in Figure 3.12, but in a different format; the Rha and Rhb
values computed under each port configuration are offset in the x-dimension (not
superimposed as in Figure 3.11, and they are labeled 2-port, 4-port and 6-port. The
curves on the far right-hand side are simply the average of the two curves for each
port configuration. The individual pairs of data points are labeled with letters ‘a’
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through ‘d’, to associate them with the position given in the 4-port graphic shown
in Figure 3.10.
The differences in the curves illustrate that Equations 3.12 and 3.13 are not
of the appropriate form, particularly for the 4-port and 6-port configurations. We
suspect that the supplementary currents, e.g. Ias1 in Figure 3.7 and 3.8, are not
properly represented by Equations 3.12 and 3.13. This is supported by the results
obtained from the 2-port model, where the supplementary currents are zero. Here,
the computed values for Rh are, in fact, good approximations of the actual values.
In contrast, the Rh values computed using Equations 3.9 and 3.10 across the
various PP models are very similar, as shown in Figure 3.13. The curves are arranged
in a similar fashion to those in Figure 3.12, except the computed values are scaled up
by a factor of two, to better illustrate their variation around the ‘average Rh ’ values
displayed in the curves on the far right. The similarity of the 4-port and 6-port
curves to the 2-port curves suggests that Equations 3.9 and 3.10 are better able to
represent the resistance characteristics of the PDS. A major portion of the difference
that remains in these curves is due to the measurement noise, as is described in the
next section.
Ω

Ω
6-port
3

3

average Rh
4-port

2
1

2-port

2

6-port

2-port

6-port

Rh

1

4-port
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0 a b c d a b c d a b c d a b c d

0 a b c d a b c d a b c d a b c d

Figure 3.12: Rh values from Eq.’s 3.12
and 3.13

4-port

Figure 3.13: Rh values from Eq.’s 3.9 and
3.10
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3.5

Noise Analysis

In this section, we describe the uncertainty associated with each measurement, how
it can be overcome, and how it affects repeatability. The large differences in the
magnitudes of the resistances of the various PDS components and supporting infrastructure make it imperative to evaluate the resolution limits of the method. For
example, the RMCs use transistors as the stimulus with DC resistances up to approximately 1000 Ωs, and the resistances in the PDS of our chips vary over two orders of
magnitude from a few hundred mΩs to approximately 10 Ωs. In other words, does
the method yield accurate results for both the large and small quantities, within a
few repetitions of the procedure?
The limits are defined by the level of precision available in the instrumentation
as well as the noise floor4 . We used Keithley 2400 precision source meters to collect
all the data. In our experiments, the noise floor is approximately 300 nA when the
Keithley is configured as an ammeter, and approximately 500 nV when configured
as a voltmeter. The range of currents varied from a few hundred µAs to a few mAs,
yielding approximately five (5) digits of precision in the measurements. With the
power supply voltage range set to 1.0 V, it was possible to get approximately 6.5 digits
of voltage precision from the instrumentation. Given these measurement limits and
resistance characteristics, the resistance resolution is estimated to be approximately
100 mΩs.
This approach to calculating the resistance resolution, however, ignores the other
detractors such as temperature effects—temperature fluctuations that occur while
the data is collected. The most straightforward way of accounting for all sources
of error is to repeat the data collection process on the same chip several times and
then use statistics to characterize the resistance variations. We collected twelve sets
4 Noise

floor (n.): the sum of all the noise sources and unwanted signals within a measurement system.
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Figure 3.14: Resistance network on the test chips.

of data from one of the chips, and then computed the mean and standard deviation
statistics on the resistance values derived from the equations.
The experiments were performed with all six PPs connected to the power supply
as shown in Figure 3.14. The set of experiments consisted of applying the three-test
procedure as described in Section 3.3 to eleven pairings of the power supply ports.
Seven of the pairings involved adjacent orthogonally-positioned PPs. They include,
in reference to Figure 3.14, PP00 -PP01 , PP01 -PP02 , PP00 -PP10 , PP01 -PP11 , PP02 PP12 , PP10 -PP11 and PP11 -PP12 . The remaining experiments involved diagonallyoriented PP pairings PP00 -PP11 , PP01 -PP10 , PP01 -PP12 and PP02 -PP11 . For example, Rpv00 , Rpv02 , Rpv10 and Rpv12 are measured three times each, while Rpv01 and
Rpv11 are measured five times each. The same is true for Rpv . Each of the eleven Rh
values are computed only once, using Equation 3.11. The labels ‘a’ through ‘k’ are
used to identify the Rh resistances (see Figure 3.14 for the labeling scheme).
A statistical plot illustrating the variations in Rpv is shown in Figure 3.15. The
six groups of Rpv are distributed along the x-axis as a sequence of twenty-two vertical
line plots. Each line plot contains twelve samples—one for each time the experiment
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Figure 3.16: Noise analysis of Rv s

was repeated. The variation in the values is illustrated as a dispersion along the
y-axis of the graph, and is quantified by the standard deviation σ. The mean and
three-σ limits are displayed as horizontal lines within each line plot.
The variation among the line plots within each of the groups as well as the
variation within each line plot itself reflect the measurement resolution. This is true
because, ideally, all of these points should have the same value. The worst-case
fractional error is given for Rpv11 in which the largest 3σ limit is 420 mΩ. The mean
value is 7.34 Ω, which yields a 6% error.
The noise floor is smaller for Rv and Rh . Figure 3.16 shows the mean and standard
deviation for Rv where the worst-case deviation is 120 mΩ for Rv10 . With a mean
value of 8.58 Ω, the fractional error in this case is 1.4%. Similar results were obtained
for the Rh analysis.
As we indicated earlier, the magnitudes of the resistance elements in the PDS
of our chips are larger than those of a commercial product. The smaller resistances
in a commercial grid impact the resistance resolution analysis reported here. For
example, the voltage drop with RMC00 enabled is approximately 7 mV in our chips.
In contrast, Figure 3.6 presents simulation data for a model that better represents
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a commercial chip, and shows the voltage drop is approximately 2 mV (3.5 times
smaller). Since the precision of the voltmeter is unchanged, and the noise level is
expected to be about the same, this suggests that our 6% maximum error could
increase to 21% for a commercial grid. However, the reduction in voltage drop is
compensated for—in part—by the increase in current resolution. For example, the
fraction of the total current drawn in our chips from PP00 with RMC00 enabled is
24% and the fraction increases to 44% in the model of the commercial grid. This
factor of 1.8 partially compensates for the loss in voltage resolution. Based on this
analysis, we expect the worst-case error to be approximately 10% for a commercial
grid5 .

3.6

Analysis of Power Grid Resistance Variations

In this section, I describe how our measurement technique was applied to two sets
of twelve chips and report the PDS resistances as modeled by Figure 3.14. The first
chip set, denoted by CS1 , was fabricated early in the development of the 65 nm
process. The second set CS2 was fabricated in the same process at a later time, after
improvements were made. Our analysis demonstrates that the proposed methodology
can be used to measure and identify the major sources of process variations in the
BEOL process steps.

3.6.1

Statistical Analysis

An illustration of the dispersion of the various observations that were made of the
various PDS components is shown in Figures 3.17 and 3.18, for chip sets CS1 and
CS2 , respectively. Although the mean of the values are similar, the variance of each
5 We

expect the error level can be reduced to less than 5% if more sophisticated instrumentation and noise reduction techniques are employed.
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resistance is larger for CS1 than it is for CS2 in four of the six cases. For example,
the variation in Rpv01 for CS1 is more than twice that for CS2 and is well above
the noise floor of 420 mΩ as shown in Figure 3.15. The extreme values in the line
plots of this group suggest that resistance varies by almost 4 Ω. The reverse trend
occurs for Rpv02 and Rpv12 , however—the variation is larger for CS2 than for CS1 .
These are the only instances where this occurred in the entire analysis, and the root
cause is difficult to determine without intrusive physical inspection. One possible
explanation is that the resistance variations in the package has changed, since Rpv
includes an off-chip Rp component.
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Figure 3.17: Rpv analysis for CS1
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Figure 3.18: Rpv analysis for CS2

The most significant differences in variation between the two sets of chips occur
in Rv . The line plots in Figures 3.19 and 3.20 display the results in a 3-D format.
The mean values of Rv for CS1 vary from 9.0 to 12.0 Ω, while those for CS2 vary
from 7.8 to 8.0 Ω. The variance for Rv in CS1 is nearly three times that of the Rv in
CS2 . As noted before, the noise floor (three-σ limit thereof) is 120 mΩ, which is well
below the inter-chip variations observed in both plots (Figures 3.19 and 3.20). The
worst-case 3σ variance for Rv in CS1 is 14.3 Ω, in contrast to 2.01 Ω for Rv in CS2 .
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Figure 3.21: Alternative RMCs used in special experiments

3.6.2

Alternative RMC Analysis

In order to investigate the source of Rv variation further, we ran a special set of
experiments involving a set of ‘alternative’ RMCs as shown in Figure 3.21, labeled
as RMCax,y . These alternative RMCs are within 5 µm of the primary set of RMCs,
which are shown as shaded boxes in Figure 3.21. The stimulus transistors in the
original set of RMCs were used in these tests, however, the voltages were measured
using the alternative RMCa voltage sense transistors. The voltage profile shown
in Figure 3.5 suggests that the resistances measured using the RMCa reflect the
characteristics of only the upper layers of the power grid6 . In other words, the
6 The

infrastructure can be designed to enable all metal layers to be characterized in the
fashion, by routing a set of voltage sense wires to each of the metal layers.
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RMCa provides an alternative measurement from the same place under the lower
power grid layers. If that second measurement is not the same, then there must be
a large amount of variation in the lower layers. If it is the same, then the inter-chip
variation must be primarily in the upper layers. If the variation measured from these
tests is smaller than that shown in Figures 3.19 and 3.20, then it can be inferred
that the main source of variation is in the lower layers of the power grid.
This is indeed the case, as shown by the line plots in Figures 3.22 and 3.23, which
illustrate that the magnitude of the variation is much smaller than that inferred from
Figures 3.19 and 3.20. Note that the magnitude of variation in Figures 3.22 and 3.23
is in the 100’s of mΩ range. In contrast to Figures 3.19 and 3.20, only a small increase
in variation is observable in the upper layers of CS1 over CS2 . From this, we can
infer that the main source of variation in Rv shown in Figure 3.19 is in the lower vias
and wires.
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Figure 3.22: Alternative RMC Rv analysis for CS1
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Figure 3.23: Alternative RMC Rv analysis for CS2

The variation in Rh is given by the line plots in Figure 3.24 and 3.25 for CS1
and CS2 , respectively. The magnitude of the variation in CS2 is only slightly smaller
than that for CS1 , which suggests the resistance per square remained fairly uniform
in the two chip sets. Bear in mind that the Rh primarily reflects the characteristics
of the top metal layers. Consequently, the lateral resistance of the lower metal layers
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cannot be measured directly using this approach7 .
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Figure 3.25: Rh analysis for CS2

Conclusion

In this chapter, we presented a method to model and measure PDS resistances.
This infrastructure can be used to characterize BEOL resistance variations during
process bring-up and debug. It can also serve as a process monitor to track variations
over time. The embedding of the infrastructure in the context of the actual circuit
increases the relevance of the resistance analysis that is provides. The results of the
analysis of resistance variations on two sets of chips fabricated in a 65nm technology
illustrates that BEOL variations can be significant (Section 3.6). The analysis showed
the proposed infrastructure can help reduce delays in manufacturing development
and yield learning cycle times cause by BEOL resistance variations.

7 Although

the analysis given for Rv reflects variations in the lower metal layers, it also
includes variations in the lower via resistances.
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Chapter 4
Using PDS Variations as a PUF
In this chapter, I describe PUFs that are based on the measured voltage variations
and equivalent resistance variations in the power distribution system (PDS) of an
IC, using the infrastructure presented in Chapter 3. The effectiveness of the PUF
is evaluated on thirty-six ICs fabricated in a 65 nm technology. This chapter is
organized into two sections, following the structure of our paper [40]. In Section
4.1, I describe the way in which we collect and derive an identity for each IC and
present an integrated architecture for the voltage drop PUF. In Section 4.2, I perform
a quantitative analysis to predict the performance of these PUFs against signature
aliasing.
In Chapter 3, we referred to the added hardware primitive as a Resistance Measurement Circuit (RMC), but in the context of this and the following chapters, we
will refer to it as a Stimulus/Measurement Circuit (SMC).
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Figure 4.1: Review of PUF circuit operation theory

4.1

Analog PUF Definition

In [40], we proposed a PUF derived using two strategies: one that is based on
voltage drops and one based on equivalent resistance. In either case, the signature
associated with the chip is composed of six quantities, each corresponding to one of
the six SMCs.
An equivalent circuit for the PUF with one of the SMCs switched on is given in
Figure 4.1. To obtain the PUF response for both the Voltage Drop and Equivalent
Resistance PUF definitions, we perform the following procedure. Clocks to the core
logic are disabled to prevent transient events on the power supply system. The
leakage current of the chip is measured with no SMC enabled and later subtracted
from the measurements. The shorting inverter and the voltage sense transistor are
both switched on. This creates a short on the bottom layer of the power and ground
grids, and allows the voltage drop to be measured on the globally-routed voltage sense
wire. The voltage drop Vdrop = VPWR − Vsense , which is the difference between sense
voltage Vsense and the power supply voltage VPWR = 0.9 V. The shorting inverter
draws approximately 1 mA (Iglob ), which produces a voltage drop of approximately
10 mV at this point on the power grid. In the ER PUF, REQ is derived from voltage
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division and is given by Equation 4.1.

REQ =

(VPWR − Vsense )
Iglob

(4.1)

By enabling each of the SMCs individually, we obtain a set of six ER and VDrop
responses, respectively, for an IC. We refer to all six quantities as the ER or VDrop
signature for that IC.
The values in the voltage drop signature are affected by the magnitude of the current through the shorting inverter. The variations in the current magnitude among
the shorting inverters actually adds to the ‘randomness’ of the PUF. However, the
PUF is also more sensitive to environmental conditions, which detracts from its ability to generate the same signature (reproducibility). The Equivalent Resistance (ER)
strategy eliminates this dependency by dividing voltage drops by the global currents.
The elimination of the current dependency makes the ER-based PUF less sensitive
to environmental variations.
Bear in mind that hundreds of SMCs can be inserted into commercial power grids,
and there is no need to limit the number of SMCs to the number of power ports.
Inserting many more SMCs would greatly expand the complexity of the signature
over that shown in these proof-of-concept experiments. Doing so is practical because
the overhead of the SMC is small, e.g., assuming a total of 100 SMCs, each with an
area of 50 µm2 yields 5,000 µm2 . This is only 0.02% of the 25,000,000 µm2 .
The PUF as described has several drawbacks. First, it is only able to produce
a single signature. i.e., n is linear to p. Second, signature generation requires the
use of external instrumentation to measure the voltages and currents. Although this
serves some applications, it poses problems for others that need to apply a challenge
and obtain a response while operating in mission mode.
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Figure 4.2: (a) Connections of a modified version of the SMC and (b) details of the
modified SMC.

Simple modifications of the PUF can address these issues. For example, the SMC
shown in Figure 3.3 can be modified to incorporate more than one ‘voltage sense’
transistor. Figure 4.2(a) shows a modification in which a second sense transistor,
‘sense 2 transistor’ is added to enable the voltage to be measured in metal 10 underneath the power port. With the second sense transistor, the voltage drops between
M1 and M10 can be measured at different places on the power grid (wherever there
is an SMC). This increases the number of possible stimulus/response pairs of the
PUF (w.r.t. the number of SMCs) from linear to quadratic because voltage drops
can now be computed between any pairing of ‘sense 1’ and ‘sense 2’ transistors across
the array of SMCs. Figure 4.2(a) shows a schematic in which an additional flip-flop,
labeled FF3 , is used to control the second sense transistor1 .
Another strategy to increase the number of challenge/response pairs is to allow
the stimulus to be applied from more than one SMC. In this scenario, multiple shorting inverters are enabled simultaneously at different locations and the voltage drops
1 Although

the ‘shorting inverter’ can be replaced with a single PFET, it is more robust
to defects since it uses stacked devices and is proposed as a fault-tolerant strategy to
prevent yield loss that would result if a defect caused the stimulus transistor to remain in
the on state.
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are measured using different combinations of sense 1 and sense 2 transistor pairs.
We refer to these scenarios as multiple-on and the former as single-on. However,
since the power grid is a linear system, superposition applies. Therefore, to make
this more resilient to attack, whereby the attacker systematically deduces the voltage drops that would occur under a multiple-on scenario by combining the single-on
measurements, this scheme can be combined with an obfuscation of the scan chain
control bits. An alternative would be to disable the single-on scenarios by design.
Under obfuscation, the number and position of the enabled shorting inverters are
deterministically (or randomly) scrambled for a given scan chain control sequence,
making it difficult or impossible to systematically apply single-on tests at known
locations on the chip. We have investigated scan-chain obfuscation techniques in
previous work where the objective was to prevent an adversary from using the scan
chain to reverse engineer a design [43, 44]. These techniques are applicable here as
well. For chip-specific random scrambling, a subset of the SMCs can be used during
initialization to define the state of a selector that controls the scan chain scrambling
configuration.
The PUF as proposed requires the use of external instrumentation to measure the
voltages and global currents needed to compute the IC’s signature. Although this
approach serves chip authentication well, e.g., where the objective is to periodically
check the authenticity of a chip with counterfeits, it is not amenable to cryptology applications that use the signature as the secret key in hardware-implemented
encryption/decryption algorithms. In order to serve this latter need, the signature
generation process needs to occur using on-chip instrumentation.
The simplest approach to accomplishing this is shown in Figure 4.3. The key
generator control unit drives the scan-in, scan-out and scan-clock signals of the SMCs
with a specific pattern to enable one or more of the shorting inverters in the array
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Figure 4.3: On-chip instrumentation for signature generation.

of SMCs2 . The scan pattern also enables two voltage sense transistors, one for
each of the two voltage sense wires, labeled sense wire 1 and sense wire 2. The
two voltage sense wires are routed to the inputs of a simple differential Operational
Amplifier (OpAmp). The OpAmp outputs a ’0’ or a ’1’ depending on whether
the voltage on ‘sense wire 1’ is larger or smaller than ‘sense wire 2’, respectively.
The 1-bit output is sent to the response generation control unit and the process is
repeated until a sufficient number of bits are generated to realize the key. Note
that this implementation is more sensitive to environmental variations because it
makes use of voltages instead of equivalent resistances, as described earlier, and
depends on the performance of the OpAmp to loyal comparison. Therefore, the
response for a given chip under a given sequence of scan patterns may differ over
time unless temperature and power supply noise are monitored and tightly controlled.
However, this method may be relatively robust to environmental variations since
it is comparing the analog voltage values, and is therefore a “differential” PUF.
Other more noise-tolerant architectures are possible but they will increase the area
overhead associated with the key generation infrastructure. The performance of this
architecture is evaluated in Chapter 5.
2 This

scheme refers to the original SMC (Figure 3.3) modified to include a second sense
transistor connected between M1 and a new voltage ‘sense wire 2’ (Figure 4.2).
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4.2

Experimental Results

We carried out a set of experiments to evaluate the diversity in the voltage drops and
equivalent resistances in a set of thirty-six chips. The chips are from two sets which
were fabricated at different times. The first set (Chip Set 1) was fabricated earlier
during technology development cycle and therefore have larger resistance variations.
The second set (Chip Set 2) was fabricated after the process matured and better
represent typical levels of process variations.
We also carried out an additional set of experiments to evaluate the stability of
the PUF. These experiments were performed on one of the chips in the set. To evaluate stability, we repeated the signature generation/measurement process seventy-two
times for two of the chips, one from each chip set3 . The variation across the set of
signatures from these experiments is due entirely to environmental noise and temperature variations. These experiments are important for determining the probability of
signature aliasing, i.e., the probability that two chips from the population generate
the same signature. We will refer later to data from these stability experiments as
control data.
The experimental results for twelve of the chips from the set of thirty-six are
shown in Figures 4.4a and 4.4b, using the voltage drops and equivalent resistances,
respectively. The left half of the figure lists the chip number along the x-axis. The
right half gives the PUF stability results for one of the chips. The six data points
defining the chip signature are displayed vertically above the chip identifier. The
y-axis gives the voltage drop and equivalent resistance, respectively, in each of the
figures.
The diversity among the signatures within the twelve chips shown on the left
side of the figures is evident in both plots. In addition to the different patterns of
3 No

temperature control or specialized low-noise test apparatus was used
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.4: (a) Voltage drop signatures for 12 chips and 12 control samples. (b)
Equivalent resistance signatures for the same 12 chips and 12 control samples.

dispersion in the signatures, the order of the data points from top to bottom is also
distinct across all chips. The ordering is in reference to the SMCs that each data point
corresponds to. For example, SMC00 in Figure 3.3 is assigned ‘0’, SMC01 is assigned
‘1’, . . . , SMC12 is assigned 5. In Figure 6, the ordering for chip 1 is 5, 1, 2, 0, 4, 3,
while the ordering for chip twelve is 3, 0, 5, 1, 2, 4. Therefore, the diversity among the
signatures due to dispersion is actually larger than what is apparent because of the
differences in the orderings. It is also clear from the PUF stability experiments that
environmental variations have an impact on the signature and therefore, they must
be taken into account.
In many cases, there are differences in the dispersion and ordering of the data
points for the same chip across the voltage drop and equivalent resistance analyses.
However, the voltage control points seem to have more uncertainty than the resistance control points. This is expected because the equivalent resistance eliminates
an element of the diversity introduced by variations in the magnitude of the shorting
currents.
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of the Euclidean distance D between two chips C1 and C2
and the uncertainty δ introduced by noise.

In order to quantify the dispersion among the chip signatures, we compute the
Euclidean distance between the data points and analyze their variance. The six
data points in each signature can be interpreted as a single point in six-dimensional
space. The Euclidean distance between two signatures for chips x and y is given by
Equation 4.2.
D = kx − yk =

p
(x1 − y1 ) + (x2 − y2 ) + · · · + (x6 − y6 )

(4.2)

Figure 4.5 illustrates our nomenclature of the response vectors of two chips, C1
and C2 , in n-dimensional space that is separated by a distance D. The Euclidean
distance is computed between all possible pairings of chips, i.e. (36 × 35)/2 = 630
combinations. Noise adds uncertainty in the exact distances between the chip response vectors, which is represented by a circle of radius δ. We define δ by computing the Euclidean distances between all possible pairings of the 72 vectors, i.e.,
(72 × 71)/2 = 2, 556 combinations, from the control data set. The distance δ is derived as one-half of the 3-sigma upper bound that characterizes the distribution of
noise distances, i.e. it is defined as 1/2 of the worst-case noise distance. With these
definitions, we can define the probability of a collision. If a response vector from
one chip is within 2δ of another chip’s response vector, then the response vectors are
considered identical and a collision occurs.
In order to compute the probability of two chips producing the same signature
given the uncertainty associated with the measurements, we first compute a histogram that tabulates the number of Euclidean distances partitioned into a set of
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Figure 4.6: Histogram of chip (a) and noise (b) equivalent resistance distances and
Gamma function fit.

bins for the chip and noise data sets, separately. The bins in each histogram are
equal in width, with each equal to 1/25th of the total span that defines the range of
Euclidean distances among the 630 and 2556 combinations of chip and noise data
pairings, respectively. We then fit these histograms to gamma probability density
functions (PDFs). The histograms and the gamma PDFs are shown superimposed in
Figures 4.6a and 4.6b, showing the chip and noise data, respectively, for the equivalent resistance analysis. In both cases, the gamma functions are a good fit to the
histograms, based on evaluations of other types of PDF. The range of values found
among the 630 chip pairings is between 0.45 and 5.0, as indicated by the x-axis, while
the range for the noise analysis is between 0.01 and 0.12. Therefore, the largest value
in the noise data is approximately four times smaller than the smallest value in the
chip data.
We compute the probability of aliasing by first determining the Euclidean distance
in the noise data that bounds 99.7% (3 sigma) of the area under the PDF. This
particular Euclidean distance upper-bounds the worst case noise and is equal to
0.099 Ohms for the data shown in Figure 4.6. We then compute the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the chip data and use this worst-case noise value (an
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Volt.
P(alias) 3.5 × 10−11

Eq. Res.
6.9 × 10−8

Table 4.1: Probability that the Euclidean distance between chips is less than 99.7%
of all noise Euclidean distances.

x value) to determine the probability of aliasing by looking up the y value on the
chip CDF associated with this x value. This gives us an estimate of the probability
that the Euclidean distance between any pairing of two chips is less than or equal to
the worst-case Euclidean distance among the control data.
The results for the equivalent resistance and voltage analyses are given in Table
4.1. Using equivalent resistance, the probability of aliasing was found to be 6.9×10−8
or approximately 1 chance in 15 million. For the voltage analysis, the probability
increases to approximately 1 chance in 28 billion, however this method may be more
susceptible to environmental variations. Evaluating the sensitivity to temperature
(for instance) is the subject of future research. Given that the number of SMCs used
to define the signature in these experiments is only six, we can expect, based on these
results, that the probability would improve in a commercial design that included a
larger number of SMCs.
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Chapter 5
Extension of the PUF and
Evaluation of Metrics
In this chapter, I present extensions to the PUF that make better use of the hardware
primitives available and an analysis of the PUF under many further quality metrics.
The discussion is broken into several sections, following the structure of our paper in
[45]. In Section 5.1, I discuss scenarios where more than one shorting-inverter can be
enabled and how these scenarios can be used. In Section 5.2, I present a new method
of creating PUF signatures that is “differential” using the same voltage data from
the previous chapter. I assess the probability of the response bits being 0s or 1s using
this differential PUF definition. In Section 5.3, I analyze the probability of aliasing
as I did in the previous chapter with the addition of the new multiple-on scenarios.
In Section 5.4, I perform a similar analysis on the differential PUF definition, where
I quantify the statistical dependence of the multiple-on vectors using the metric of
bit “entropy”.
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Table 5.1: Chip configurations and number of response
# SMCs enabled # Configurations
1-on
6
15
2-on
3-on
20
15
4-on
5-on
6
1
6-on

5.1

# Responses
6
30
60
60
30
6

Multiple-Shorting Scenarios

In this section, we introduce an extension to our PUF where additional challenges
are introduced by allowing more than one of the shorting inverters to be enabled at
a time. For example, if the shorting inverters from two SMCs are enabled simultaneously, then two responses can be obtained by measuring the VDrop at each SMC
location separately. We refer to these configurations as x-on scenarios, to distinguish
them from the 1-on scenario described in Chapter 4. A corresponding set of ERs
can be computed by dividing each of the VDrops by Ishort , the sum of the shorting
currents from the set of enabled SMCs. With a total of six SMCs in our test chips, it
is possible to obtain a total of 192 response bits by enabling different combinations
of SMCs. For example, there are a total of 15 configurations in which two SMCs are
enabled (2-on scenario), with each configuration generating 2 responses, for a total of
30 responses. For the 3-on scenario, there are 20 configurations and 60 response bits.
The number of configurations and response bits for each x-on scenario for our test
chips are tabulated in Table 5.1. The general closed-form expression for the number
of possible response values for n SMCs is given by Equation 5.1.

 
n
X
n
i
= n2n−1
i
i=1

(5.1)
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Figure 5.1 gives a box plot analysis of the ERs computed from our 36 chips split
into 6 groups along the x-axis, one group for each x-on scenario (1-on, 2-on, etc.).
The groups are labeled on the x-axis, with the label indicating the number of SMCs
simultaneously enabled. The distribution is summarized by 5 values in each box plot;
the medium, the upper and lower fence limits (for largest and smallest observations,
resp.), upper and lower quartiles, and outliers (figure labels the 1-on case). The
range and variation of the ERs decrease by a factor proportional to the number of
enabled SMCs, n, because of the increasing magnitude of the accumulating stimulus
currents. Figure 5.2 is the same box plot for the VDrop analysis. According to the
figure, as the number of shorting inverters is increased, the effective voltage drop
measured increases linearly, since additional stimulus current is drawn through the
PDS.
By using the means and variances of the data in each column of these box plots,
the following observations were made. The trend of the ER magnitude versus the
number of stimulus currents n can be estimated by the exponential function R =
16.2e−0.86n + 2.5 Ω, with a variance that is highly non-linear for n = 1, 2 but follows
0.62e−0.70n + 0.0023 for n > 2. For the VDrop magnitude versus the number of
stimulus currents, the trend can be estimated by an line, V = (7.67E−4)n + 0.0065
V, with a variance that follows (2.35E−8)n + 2E−7. These trends and fits are shown
in Figure 5.3 Therefore, we can make the following generalizations. The magnitude
of the ERs decreases exponentially and has a non-linearly-decreasing variation. The
magnitude of the VDrops increase linearly and have a variation that is approximately
constant.
Figure 5.4 shows the box-plots obtained after standardizing the data from Figure
5.1. Standardization makes it possible to compare the ERs from different groups
and is accomplished using Equation 5.2, the standard Z-score equation. The µgroup
term is the mean ER computed using all ER responses from the same group and the
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Figure 5.1: Box plots of 1-on through 6-on (x-axis) ER values (y-axis) measured
from 36 chips.

σgroup value is the standard deviation for this group. Separate means and standard
deviations are computed for each of the other x-on groups and used to create the
Z-scores (as shown on the y-axis). Standardization effectively shifts and scales the
data so that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is one.


ERstd =

ERorig − µgroup
σgroup


(5.2)

Although standardization eliminates the effects of increasing global currents for
the multiple-on scenarios, signal-to-noise will eventually limit how many SMCs can be
enabled in practice. As more SMCs are enabled, the magnitude of the global current
will continue to increase but the resolution of the instrumentation will remain fixed
(in our setup, current resolution is approximately 1 µA). Assuming the instrumentation provides five digits of resolution and each SMC introduces approximately 1 mA,
this sets the limit to approximately 100 or fewer simultaneously-enabled SMCs. This
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Figure 5.2: Box plots of 1-on through 6-on (x-axis) VDrop values (y-axis) measured
from 36 chips.

limit restricts the number of ER responses available below that given by Equation
5.1 for scenarios in which more than 100 SMCs are embedded in an IC. We address
this topic further in Section 5.4.
Standardization also allows an analysis of the entire data set. We indicated
earlier that an important quality metric of a PUF is its degree of randomness. A
first order measure of randomness can be obtained by constructing a histogram that
bins the Z-score representation of the responses. The ideal distribution with respect
to randomness is a uniform distribution. Non-uniform behavior, e.g. clustering, in
the responses makes the PUF susceptible to certain attacks such as the prediction
attack [41]. Figure 5.5 gives the histogram of all 192 ER Z-scores from the 36
chips. The distribution is best fit with a Gaussian PDF, shown superimposed on
the histogram in the figure. Although not ideal, the symmetric nature of a Gaussian
is desirable and more robust to attacks in comparison to skewed distributions. A
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Figure 5.3: Trends and fits of means and variances of ERs and VDrops for the
multiple-on scenarios.

similar distribution and conclusion holds for the VDrop analysis (not shown).

5.2

Single-Bit Probability Analysis

A more quantitative evaluation of PUF randomness is presented in this section. The
single-bit probability evaluates the symmetry in the statistical distribution of each
ER response, as opposed to the entire population as shown in Figure 5.5. In this
analysis, we first discretize the ER responses by computing the mean of each of the
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Figure 5.4: Scaled box plots of 1-on through 6-on (x-axis) ER values (y-axis) measured from 36 chips.

192 response values. Each of the 192 means are used to threshold the 36 individual
responses from the chips. Response values larger than the mean are assigned 1 while
those below the mean are assigned 0.
It is not clear how to perform this operation (comparing a voltage with the mean
voltage) in hardware, however there are several possible solutions. For example, the
voltage at one SMC could be designated as a representative of the mean, or the
voltage could be compared with all other voltages and the number of 1’s (from being
greater than) could be counted.
The level of randomness can then be easily measured by counting the number
of ‘1’s and ‘0’s in each set. Sets that have equal numbers of ‘1’s and ‘0’s, i.e. 50%
of each, are perfectly random. Each bit is then like a flip of a fair coin. Figure
5.6 gives the results of the analysis using ERs. The x-axis numbers the response
bit groups from 1 to 192 and the y-axis gives the probability of a ‘1’ across the 36
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Figure 5.5: Histogram and Gaussian fit of standardized ERs from 192 responses and
36 chips.

chips analyzed. It is clear that the individual distributions cluster around the ideal
behavior of 50%, with deviations ranging from 40% to 60%. The average probability
across all 192 groups is 47.5% for the ER analysis, and 54.5% for the VDrop analysis
(not shown).

5.3

Collision Probability Analysis

In this section, we analyze the probability that two chips produce the same response,
as we did in Chapter 4, but we will now consider the multiple-on scenarios. Although
this analysis can be performed using the binary versions of the ERs, as described
in Section 5.2, the analog ERs more accurately portray the true variations in the
data and allow noise to be more easily factored into the analysis. The analysis is
carried out on pairings of the chip response vectors. With 36 chips, there are 630
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Figure 5.6: Single-bit probability analysis of the ER PUF.

such pairings (36 choose 2). The ERs (or Voltage Drops (VDrops)) for a specific IC
are arranged into a 192-dimensional vector, R = [r1 , r2 , . . . , rn ], and the Euclidean
Distance (ED) between each pairing of vectors is computed using Equation 4.2. The
probability of a collision is computed by creating two histograms: one constructed
using all 630 ER EDs from the 36 chips and one constructed from a set of 72 noise
samples, obtained by repeating the entire SMC measurement process 72 times using
one of the chips. The number of pairings and resulting EDs for the noise samples is
2556 (72 choose 2). We then fit each histogram using a gamma Probability Density
Function (PDF). The probability of a collision is computed by first determining an
ED value that bounds 99.73% (3 sigma) of the area under the noise PDF. The area
to the left of this value in the chip PDF expresses the probability of collision [41].
We compute the probability of a collision by creating two histograms that estimate the measured probability density function, one for the chips using the 630 ER
EDs and one for the noise data using the 2,556 ER EDs. We then fit each histogram
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Figure 5.7: Gamma function fit of noise (left) and chip (right) ER Euclidean distance
(ED) histograms.

using a gamma PDF, as shown in Figure 5.7. The probability of collision is determined by first determining the Euclidean distance that bounds 99.7% (3-sigma) of
the area under the PDF from the noise data set. This value is shown as 0.1 in the
blow-up on the right side of Figure 5.7. We then compute the area under the chip
PDF to the left of this value, as shown by the shaed region in the blow-up. Finding
this area is the same as looking up the noise bound (an x-value) on the corresponding
chip Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF). This area is a fraction of the total
area under the chip PDF, which is one (1), and expresses the probability of collision.
To understand how the additional responses are adding to the diversity in presence of additional measurement noise, we compute the probability of a collision as
a function of the response vector size by considering incrementally-larger sets of re-
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sponse bits. The PDFs for the noise and chip ER analysis are shown in Figures 5.8
and 5.9, respectively, with ED on the x-axis and frequency on the y-axis. The histograms are shown as curves in both figures, with the left-most curves corresponding
to the analysis of response vectors using only the 6 1-on values from the noise/chips.
The sequence of curves to the right correspond to analyses of increasingly-larger
response vectors with values added from the 2-on, 3-on, etc. (x-on) tests. By comparing the noise and chip analysis, it is apparent that the ED of the response vectors
increases as values are added for both the noise and chip data, so the merit of including the multiple-on scenarios depends on how these two track. Ideally, the rate of
increase in the noise is smaller than the rate of increase in the chip diversity, which
is the case for this data.
Figure 5.10 plots the inverse probability of collision (y-axis) as the response vector
size is increased from 6 to 192 (x-axis). The increasing trend associated with the
curve illustrates that by adding the responses from the higher-order x-on tests, the
inverse probability of collision increases by a factor of 36. Table 5.2 summarizes the
important characteristics of the analysis: the maximum noise and minimum chip ED
measured, the threshold chosen on the noise, and the corresponding probability of
aliasing P(alias). This analysis indicates that these additional responses add to the
diversity in the response vectors. It is also clear, however, that the diversity increase
begins to saturate with the addition of the 5-on and 6-on responses. Therefore,
increasing the number of simultaneously SMCs beyond 6 is of limited value.

5.4

Entropy Analysis

The primary objective of this analysis is to determine the level of entropy that exists
in various subsets of the ER and VDrop response vectors, including the new multipleon scenarios. The analysis is performed on the digital values, as discussed in Section
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Figure 5.8: ER ED cumulative PDFs of noise for groups 1-on through 6-on.

5.2, and is computed by comparing pairs of ER and VDrop response values on the
same chip. This models an actual use scenario in which a response bit is determined
by the relative differences in the analog response from two SMCs in the circuit, which
is emulated using two configurations of the PUF circuitry.
n Max Noise Min Chip Threshold
6
0.1172
0.4740
0.1092
0.1507
0.8061
0.1247
36
96
0.1735
1.0055
0.1431
156
0.1811
1.0728
0.1539
186
0.1841
1.0858
0.1583
192
0.1849
1.0875
0.1591
Table 5.2: Collision Analysis
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Figure 5.9: ER ED cumulative PDFs of chips for groups 1-on through 6-on.

A response bit in our analysis is ‘1’ if the first ER or VDrop response of a SMC
pairing is larger than the second, and ‘0’ otherwise. To determine upper and lower
bounds on entropy, we consider two ways of selecting the pairs. In the first analysis,
called Core, only 5 pairings of the 6 SMCs are considered, as a means of avoiding
correlation (see [38]). We treat the results of this analysis as a lower bound on the
available entropy. The Core analysis pairings are illustrated in Figure 5.11(a) as P0
through P4 . The second, called All, includes all possible pairings of the 6 SMCs,
which generates 6 × 5/2 = 15 bits.
As indicated earlier, it is possible to enable more than one SMC at a time. The
ER response bits under the x-on scenarios can be different from the response bits
from the 1-on scenario because they are affected by the total current, which is a
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Figure 5.10: Collision probability using ER response vector sizes from 6 to 192.

function of multiple independent shorting currents. Changes in the relative values of
the ERs on the same chip will reflect as bit-flips as shown by the example in Figure
5.11 (b) and (c). The response vectors under (b) portray the response bits across
the 5 pairings in the 1-on Core analysis. The response vectors for each of the chips,
Cx , are given as rows. In contrast, (c) shows the response vectors under the 2-on
scenario for the same chips and pairings. The values in parenthesis on the far right
are the Hamming Distance (HD) between the two vectors. For example, C1 under

Figure 5.11: Pairing and analysis illustration.
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(c) has two bit-flips (and an HD of 2) when compared with the vector under (b).
We use the HD to measure how much entropy is added over the 1-on base case
for each of the x-on scenarios. The value of 9.4% given in the bottom-right of
Figure 5.11(c) is computed by summing the HDs of the individual chips and dividing
by the total number of bits that are compared. For the Core analysis shown in
the example, the sum of the 36 chip HDs is 17. The entropy measure of 9.4% is
computed as 17/180, where the denominator is computed as 36 chips ×5 bits. The
curves in Figure 5.12 show the average increase in entropy across the 6 x-on analyses
as 4 curves, one each for the Core and All scenarios using the VDrop and ER data
sets. The 1-on base case shown as the left-most data point on each of the curves is
the probability of an arbitrary response bit being ‘1’, decided by comparing it with
the mean (see Section 5.2. For the ER data curves, the probability is precisely 50%.
Under the Core analysis, the response vector size is 5 bits for each of the 36 chips. Of
the 180 bits (5 × 36), we observed exactly 90 ‘1’s. The result under the All analysis
is 270 ‘1’s, exactly half of the 540 bits (15 × 36).
The remaining points on the graph each represent the average HD between the
previous response vector and the vector generated using the x-on data identified on
the x-axis. We refer to this change in entropy as ‘delta entropy’, and it represents the
additional diversity obtained by adding those scenarios. For example, the ER Core
analysis value for the 2-on scenario is given as 9.4% (we described this case earlier
in reference to Figure 5.11). From the graph, the All analysis produced a similar
value. Both of these values represent a relatively-small increase in entropy over the
1-on base case. This indicates that the 1-on and the 2-on scenarios are correlated.
The VDrop values indicate very little delta entropy. This is intuitive because the
VDrop responses under the multiple-on scenarios cannot leverage the cross-coupling
interaction of the SMC shorting currents used in the ER response calculation.
For the 3-on through 6-on scenarios, the delta entropies, although small, are
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Figure 5.12: Entropy analysis of VDrops and ERs.

not zero and therefore represent a positive increase in the cumulative entropy. For
the 3-on through 5-on scenarios, we arbitrarily chose the locations of the additional
enabled SMCs, e.g., 1 additional SMC for 3-on, 2 for 4-on, etc., beyond the two used
in the pairing. The trends in delta entropy in Figure 5.12 support the behavior of the
curve shown in Figure 5.10, which tends to saturate, particularly for the right-most
data points representing the 5-on and 6-on scenarios.

5.5

Discretized Signature Evaluation

Given these results, we can approximate the number of response bits that are truly
random. As indicated earlier, the Core analysis represents a conservative bound
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Table 5.3: Discrete Signature Metrics
Inter-chip
Intra-chip
Analysis
ER
VDrop
ER
VDrop
Core
48.0% 48.0%
0%
0%
All
48.5% 48.5% 0.64% 0.59%
where the number of pairing is restricted to (n − 1) per x-on scenario. Therefore,
a chip with n SMCs can produce 6 × (n − 1) unique response bits, assuming the
delta entropy goes to zero for more than 6 enabled SMCs. For the optimistic All
analysis, the number of meaningful response bits is given by Equation 5.3. For our
chips, these expressions produce 30 and 255 bits, respectively, with 6 SMCs.

Nbits

  X
 
n−2 
n
n−2 n
n(n − 1)
+ (n − 1)n2n−3
=
+
=
2
i
2
2
i=0

(5.3)

We also performed a pairwise HD analysis using the entire 30-bit and 255-bit
response vectors from the Core and All analyses, respectively. We compute the
average HD per bit by computing the HDs between all possible chip pairs, taking
the average HD, and then dividing by the number of bits in the response. Ideally,
each comparison should produce an HD that is exactly half of the number of bits in
the response vector. The evaluation of our PUF under this metric is summarized in
Table 5.3. The inter-chip HDs are computed between chips, and the intra-chip HDs
are computed using the noise sample. These values compare favorably to 46.15%, as
reported in [38].
We also evaluate reproducibility by carrying out a second pairwise HD analysis
using the 72 sets of ‘noise’ samples described earlier. The average HD is computed,
as described above, using the 30-bit and 255-bit response vectors. These results are
also listed in Table 5.3. These results also compare favorably with 0.48% obtained
in [38] and provides evidence that our PUF is robust to environmental noise and
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ambient temperature variations.
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Chapter 6
Temperature Effects
In this chapter, I introduce active temperature control to the PUF analysis. The
changes to the setup and the characteristics of parameters such as leakage current
are presented in Section 6.1. Adding temperature control has two benefits. First,
it helps us to improve the stability of the chip temperature, which is affected by
changing room temperature conditions that we had no control of previously. I make
a comparison of how stable the on-chip temperature and other parameters are both
with and without control in Section 6.2. Second, temperature control allows us
to subject our PUF to different temperature points between 0◦ C and 75◦ C and
characterize the effects on performance. By aggregating samples from these extremes,
we can comment on the effect that temperature has on the PUFs in the worst-case.
The metrics on the analog and digital PUFs are revisited with temperature control in
Sections 6.3 and 6.4, respectively. In Section 6.3.3, vector angles are also considered
as a measure between vectors that is more resistant to temperature-induced changes
in the analog vectors than the Euclidean distance. Finally, in Section 6.5, I discuss a
reality of our chips that affects the accuracy of our measurements, and also explains
some of the peculiar relationships of our parameters with respect to temperature.
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As a brief review of the techniques presented in Chapters 4 and 5, the LabVIEW
VI that collects the PUF data yields a table for each run of the experiment. As is
discussed in Section 5.1, if we consider the 6 single-shorting scenarios and include the
multiple-on (2, 3, . . . , 6) scenarios, we have a total of 192 configurations. Each table
then has 192 rows, one for each configuration. The columns of the table include four
raw measurements that we make: the leakage current and voltage, and the current
and voltage with the shorting transistors on. We refer to the nominal condition as
the “leak” condition, and the condition with the shorting transistor on as the “short”
condition. I compute the voltage drop Vdrop as the difference of the leakage voltage
and the short voltage, Vleak −Vshort . The shorting current Ion , for the shorting inverter
is computed using the difference of the total current under the shorting condition
and the leakage current, Ishort − Ileak . This represents the additional current drawn
by the shorting transistors. The equivalent resistance Req is given by the ratio of the
voltage drop to the shorting current,
Req =

6.1

Vleak − Vshort
.
Ishort − Ileak

Modifying the Experiment Setup

Our test PCB was designed at IBM to enable the test chips to be inserted in a
clamshell apparatus. This allows them to be changed quickly, and also supports
temperature control hardware. The apparatus consists of four posts attached to a
heat sink and a tightening mechanism that retains a stack of parts, and aligns the
pads on the chip to the pads on the PCB. See Figure 6.1. At the bottom of the
stack is an aluminum part into which the ends of the four posts lock. Through this
piece is a screw that allows pressure to be applied to the next metal piece in the
stack. That metal piece firmly applies pressure, pushing the PCB up against the
heat sink, and compressing the whole stack. Between that piece of metal and the
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Figure 6.1: Clamshell apparatus cross-sectional diagram

PCB is an insulating plastic piece which protects the pads on the PCB from the
aluminum plate. The chip sits in a retainer which has an array of gold spring-like
pins that connect the ball grid pads on the chip package to the pads on the board
when under pressure. The chip package has two chips on it, which rise slightly out
of the package. Above this, we have another plastic insulator, which is thin enough
that heat insulation is minimal, and a reasonable amount of heat transfers from the
plate into the chips. This insulator serves to protect the chips from the aluminum
sensor retainer, both from mechanical damage and condensation.
I built the aluminum sensor retainer in the department machine shop using a
milling machine and a drill press. It accepts two disc thermistors with their lead
wires. The lead-wires were insulated with heat-shrink wrap and the thermistors are
held in place with some thermal paste and pressure from the clamshell apparatus.
The aluminum sensor retainer is designed to conduct heat from the Marlow TEC to
the plastic chip insulator and to the chip, while retaining temperature sensors. One
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Figure 6.2: On-chip resistor for characterizing resistance

thermistor is connected to a multimeter to allow the temperature to be displayed,
providing a redundant measure of temperature. The other is connected to the temperature controller for feedback. The thermoelectric cooler is a Marlow Industries
DT6-4L. It is capable of handling up to 3.7 amps (Imax ) at 8.2 volts DC (Vmax ) and
is capable of moving up to 22 Watts of heat. The temperature controller is a NewPort Model 325B, and can drive up to 2.5 amps. It can work with several types of
temperature sensors. The first is any Negative Temperature Coefficient (NTC) thermistor that can be modeled by the Steinhart-Hart equation, which is defined later
in Equation 6.6. The second type are IC sensors, which accept a constant current
and control their voltage to make the temperature-voltage relationship linear. This
type of sensor would have been easier to interface with, but they were too large to
be easily adapted to our system.

6.1.1

On-Chip Thermistor

A long track in the lowest metal layer (M1) is embedded in the chip for the purposes of measuring the resistance per square in that layer. A four-wire configuration
is provided so that the resistance of the track can be accurately measured without
being affected by the resistance of the probe wiring. There are four connections,
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Measurements of R
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Figure 6.3: On-chip resistance versus temperature

+current, −current, +voltage and −voltage. The four-wire method works by connecting a constant-current source between the +current and −current connections,
and a voltage meter between the +voltage and −voltage connections. The current is
then controlled, for example 100µA. The voltage lines measure the voltage accurately
at either end of the snaking metal trace since no current is drawn through these lines.
Then, it is straightforward to find the resistance by applying Ohm’s law, V = IR,
since I is known and V is measured.
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Figure 6.4: Residuals for linear regression of on-chip resistance versus temperature

The resistance as a function of temperature for many metals can be approximated
by a linear model involving the temperature coefficient of resistance α. The model
for a generalized resistor can be written as
R = Rref [1 + α(T − Tref )],

(6.1)

where Rref is the resistance at the reference temperature Tref in ◦ C, α is the temperature coefficient of resistance and T is the specific temperature (the independent
variable). For copper, with Tref = 20◦ C, α = 0.0039 [46].
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The metal track on the chip can also be used as a thermistor since its resistance is
a function of temperature. We were unable to use this thermistor in our experiments
because we would have to characterize the resistance-temperature function for each
chip and this would not have been feasible. I performed a temperature sweep from
−5◦ C to 75◦ C in one-degree increments. At each step, the resistance was measured
with the instrument in 4-wire mode after thermal equilibrium (as described later
in Section 6.1.3) was reached. Figure 6.3 shows these 80 measurements as circles
◦. Then, I performed a linear regression using y = mx + b, which yields the slope
m = 3.796 and the y-intercept b = 2646. This line is drawn in red in the figure.
From this linear model, R0 = 2722Ω. Then, from Equation (6.1), we can draw a
line that pivots about the point T = 20, R = 2722 and represents the behavior the
resistor would have if it were pure copper.
Although it is clear from the figure that a linear fit is reasonable, there is some
minor error in the fit. I have plotted the residuals, which represent the difference
between the measurement and the fit, in Figure 6.4. This error probably represents
heat being lost and gained to the room, at the hot and cold temperature extremes,
respectively. Since the resistance of the copper metallization layer that we’re measuring should certainly be a linear function of temperature, this error must represent
the limits of our temperature control apparatus. In other words, although it is very
close, the chip is not at the exact temperature target at the hot and cold extremes,
and this will affect our further measurements.
Next, I wish to relate the coefficients m, b of the linear regression with the parameters of the physical resistance model. From Equation (6.1), when T = Tref , it is
clear that R = Rref . The linear model y = mx + b also yields Rref when T = Tref , so
Rref = 2722Ω using m and b from above for the experimental data. I can also solve
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for m and b in terms of Rref and α by rearranging terms in Equation (6.1),
R = Rref [1 + α(T − Tref )]

(6.2)

= Rref + Rref α(T − Tref )

(6.3)

= Rref + Rref αT − Rref αTref

(6.4)

= Rref α T + Rref (1 − αTref ) .
| {z }
|
{z
}

(6.5)

m

b

From this, it is clear that m = Rref α and b = Rref (1 − αTref ). From m = Rref α,
α = m/Rref and therefore α = 0.001394. This experimental α is 64% smaller than
the known coefficient for pure copper, which is an indication of the quality of the
metallization [47].

6.1.2

GE Thermistor Characterization

In this section, I present the characterization I did of the thermistor that we used
to measure the temperature as close as possible to the chip and provide feedback to
the temperature controller. In an ideal setup, the thermistor would be on-chip, but
as mentioned in Section 6.1.1, it was not possible to use our on-chip thermistor with
our temperature controller.
Most NTC thermistors can be modeled by the Steinhart-Hart Equation, which is
a third-order polynomial that relates the temperature T to the natural logarithm of
the thermistor resistance R [48]. The equation is
1
= a + b ln(R) + c ln3 (R)
T

(6.6)

The parameters a, b and c are specific to each device and published by the manufacturer. The error in the Steinhart-Hart equation is generally less than 0.02 ◦ C in the
measurement of temperature [48].
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Figure 6.5: GE RL1007-624 thermistor characterization

However, the thermistor we used has its specifications given using the B-parameter equation, which is an alternative representation of the Steinhart-Hart equation
for NTC thermistors. Instead of a, b and c, the temperature-resistance relationship
is specified by R0 and B. The B-parameter equation,

1
1
1
=
+ ln
T
T0 B
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R0
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is obtained by substituting the following for the Steinhart-Hart parameters,

a = (1/T0 ) − (1/B)ln(R0 )

(6.7)

b = 1/B

(6.8)

c = 0.

(6.9)

The specifications given for the General Electric (GE) RL1007-624-73-D1 are as
follows. It is a NTC thermistor that has 1kΩ of resistance at 25◦ C with B = 3468.
So, R0 = 1kΩ and T0 = 25◦ C = 298.15 K. However, the NewPort 325B Temperature
Controller will only accept Steinhart-Hart thermistor parameters for the purposes
of converting internally between resistance and temperature. Therefore, I computed
the Steinhart-Hart parameters using Equations (6.7) through (6.9), which yield:

a = 1.3622 × 10−3

(6.10)

b = 2.8835 × 10−4

(6.11)

c = 0.

(6.12)

The temperature controller would not accept c = 0, due to some internal limitation, so I was forced to use 0.001 × 10−7 . Using these parameters with the SteinhartHart equation, and in conjunction with a temperature sweep I did using an auxiliary
thermometer, I was able to create the plot shown in Figure 6.5. From the figure, it
is clear that the parameters R0 and B fit the device well, so we used them directly
with the assumption that the manufacturer’s specifications are more accurate than
our auxiliary thermometer.
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6.1.3

Controlling On-Chip Temperature

Now that we have a way to control the temperature of a plate that contacts the
chips through a thin film of plastic (see Figure 6.1 in Section 6.1), we can drive
the chips very close to a target temperature within a reasonable amount of time.
The next challenge is to ensure that the temperature of the chip is both the within
range of the target temperature and in thermal equilibrium (i.e., the temperature
is stable). A good indication of on-chip temperature is leakage current. I observed
that a change in temperature has an immediate effect on the chip leakage current,
however the leakage current continues to change after the temperature controller has
reached its set-point. Therefore, the chip has some “thermal mass” and does not
reach the temperature of the plate immediately. However, the leakage current does
saturate within a few minutes, indicating thermal equilibrium. Figure 6.6 shows the
TEC temperature and chip leakage as the temperature goes through a transition
of one degree, from 52◦ C to 53◦ C. On the first row in the figure, the temperature
is plotted over time. The controller first overshoots the target temperature before
settling back down to 53◦ C. The next row is the controller’s output, the TEC current,
which is positive when it is cooling and negative when it is heating. The last row is
the leakage current, which tracks the temperature, but requires some time to do so.
After the temperature and the leakage current have stabilized, the first experiment was to characterize the relationship between temperature and leakage current.
This helped us verify that our setup is correct and helped us understand more about
the leakage current behavior of our chips. The chip was brought to 0◦ C and then
warmed up by one degree Celsius at a time to 75◦ C. As I performed this sweep of
temperature, I made measurements of the corresponding leakage currents after waiting for the system to reach thermal equilibrium at each degree. From semiconductor
theory, we know that temperature should have an exponential effect on the leakage current of MOSFETs, since it appears in the exponential of the sub-threshold
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Figure 6.6: Example transition from 52 to 53 degrees Celsius
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V
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/q
ID = IS e
1−e
(1 + λVDS ).

(6.13)

We are only measuring the leakage current of the entire chip, and most of the circuits
involve a PMOS and an NMOS in series. Fitting experimental data to the model
in Equation 6.13 is not possible without more specific information, for example, a
characterization of single transistors on the same chip. Understanding all of the
transistor characteristics was not the goal of this work. Instead, we use the form
of a general exponential relationship, f (x) = aebx , where a and b are constants, to
characterize the leakage current.
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Figure 6.7: Trends of leakage current versus temperature, y-axis is logarithmic
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Chip
C20 n
C39 o
C39 n

eb
−5

6.605 × 10
9.476 × 10−6
2.400 × 10−5

m
0.01865
0.02410
0.02256

Table 6.1: Fitted model parameters for leakage current versus temperature using the
model Ileak = emT +b = eb emT

Figure 6.7 shows the trends of leakage current as a function of temperature for
measurements made on several chips. Note that the y-axis is logarithmic. From the
figure, the trends appear to be straight lines when a logarithmic y-axis is used, and
therefore an exponential fit is appropriate for the data. I take pairs of temperature
T and the natural logarithm of leakage current Ileak , and form (x, y) pairs. Then, I
can apply a linear regression y = mx + b to the data using the model,
ln(Ileak ) = m |{z}
T +b.
| {z }
x

y

By using both sides of this equation as the exponent of e, I obtain
Ileak = emT +b = eb emT = b0 emT ,
where m and b0 = eb are constants. This is then the appropriate generalized form
for leakage current versus temperature, as described above. Table 6.1 presents the
constants found for various chips using this model.
I created a LabVIEW virtual instrument (VI) in order to manage controlling
temperature to different points and collecting the PUF data. A screen shot of the
front panel is shown in Figure 6.8. The LabVIEW VI first turns on the temperature
controller, then begins to read the temperature feedback, thermoelectric current and
chip current. The chip is configured so that all the transistors are off during this
process and therefore the chip current is the leakage current. The VI then goes
into a loop that waits until equilibrium is reached. It qualifies equilibrium using
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the temperature and leakage current and checks for four simultaneous conditions
before collecting the PUF data. It waits for (1) the temperature read-back to be
within a tolerance of the target (e.g., 10%) using the Kelvin scale, (2) the change
in temperature per change in time (dT /dt) to be small enough to indicate that the
temperature is stable, (3) the change in leakage current per change in time (dI/dt)
to be small enough to indicate the leakage current is stable and (4) enough time to
pass to make a stable measurements of dT /dt and dI/dt. It uses the slope of a linear
regression to compute dT /dt and dI/dt. The thresholds on these quantities were
determined empirically. Since the leakage current is a strong (exponential) function
of temperature, we can use the leakage temperature behavior to understand on-chip
temperature more accurately than the temperature read-back, which is an off-chip
thermistor. Specifically, if the leakage current is not changing (dI/dt = 0), then we
assume that the change in on-chip temperature dT /dt = 0 and it is practically equal
to the controlled temperature.
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Figure 6.8: LabVIEW front panel
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6.2

Noise Analysis

In order to better understand the uncertainty in our measurements, I performed a
thorough characterization of the measurement noise. This gives us confidence in the
results that we derive using these measurements to understand the behavior of the
performance of the various PUFs at different temperature points. In this section, I
explain how this was done and present the noise characteristics.
Revisiting our experimental data that we used for the DAC 2010 publication [45],
I was able to characterize the variation of the system without temperature control
for comparison. The left-hand side of Figure 6.9 shows the 12 × 6 × 192 = 13824
samples of leakage voltage and leakage current and the ±3σ limits for the sample.
We define the noise floor as 3σ, three times the standard deviation, for the noise
samples. From the figure, it is clear that there is a high level of variation in the
leakage current, presumably due to temperature drift. Although additional leakage
current should increase the voltage drop across the power grid, there is not a clear
relationship between the drift in the leakage current and leakage voltage.
The right-hand side of Figure 6.9 shows the same two measurements, leakage
voltage and current, with the new temperature-controlled experimental setup. It
is clear that the ±3σ range is smaller: 2µA rather than 6µA. The discontinuities
that are visible are due to the system cycling through the temperatures, to prevent
staying at cold temperatures for too long. Fluctuations in room temperature still
introduce some variability in the on-chip temperature after reaching equilibrium. We
could eliminate this uncertainty by using an on-chip thermistor in the TEC feedback
loop.
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active temperature control
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Figure 6.10 shows the voltage and current measurements that we made with the
shorting conditions present. The top row is a plot of all the samples we made, and
it is clear from the periodicity that there is a “signal” present. In the bottom row,
I have plotted the same variables but with fewer samples so that the periodicity of
the signal is clear. The detail view shows the first 2.5 × 192 = 480 samples so that
two and a half cycles can be seen. This is compelling because it illustrates our “PUF
signal”. To understand the noise floor of each measurement, I pick the first one from
each period, yielding 12 × 6 samples of that part of the signal. These 72 samples
are plotted in Figure 6.11 on the left-hand side. Both Vdrop and Req are relatively
stable. They are not highly correlated with the fluctuations in temperature which
are seen in the left-hand side of Figure 6.9. The results from the experiment with
active temperature control is shown in Figure 6.11 on the right-hand side. The result
is similar to that without temperature control, but the noise level is somewhat lower,
as I will show later.
In Figure 6.12, I show the mean value of the parameter versus temperature. The
±3σ limits are drawn as dashed lines in the figure. From the figure, the following
trends can be observed. The leakage voltage (top-left), which is affected by both the
leakage current (bottom-left) and changes in resistance due to temperature, tends to
decrease as temperature increases. For example, approximately four times the leakage current is being drawn through the grid at 75◦ C than at 0◦ C, and this additional
current pulls the grid voltage down by approximately 150nV. The leakage current
(bottom-left) increases exponentially with increasing temperature, as is expected.
The short voltage (top-middle) is affected by both the short current (bottom-middle)
and changes in the grid resistance. The short voltage and current shown here are
the direct measurements; the leakage voltage and current have not been subtracted
out. Unlike the leakage voltage, the short voltage (top-middle) is not pulled down
lower when there is greater short current (bottom-middle), but rather they do not
seem to be directly related. The short current (bottom-middle), which is mostly the

85

Chapter 6. Temperature Effects

“on” (saturation) current of the transistor, increases as temperature increases. The
voltage drop (top-right) is the difference between the leakage voltage (top-left) and
the short voltage (top-middle). The voltage drop tends to decrease as temperature
increases. The equivalent resistance is the voltage drop divided by the on current
(short current minus the leakage current). The equivalent resistance also tends to
decrease as temperature increases. The effect of temperature on the Vdrop and Req
is revisited later in Section 6.3.1. Finally, there is a parasitic leakage current that
affects the observe voltage and distorts this analysis. I analyze this effect later in
Section 6.5
Figure 6.13 shows the value 3σ used to draw the dashed lines in Figure 6.12 divided by the mean u. The quantity 3σ/µ, which we refer to as the relative noise
floor, represents the measurement noise with respect to the magnitude of the measurement. From this detailed view, we can make the following observations about
how the relative measurement noise is affected by temperature. The leakage voltage
(top-left) and leakage current measurements are both more stable at higher temperatures. The short voltage (top-middle) is more stable at lower temperatures, while
the short current (bottom-middle) shows a minimum noise level at 50◦ C. The voltage
drop and equivalent resistance also have a minimum at 25◦ C and are worst at higher
temperatures.
Table 6.2 reports the 3σ noise floors for the various samples recorded without
temperature control (for DAC 2010), from which the following observations can be
made. Note that the noise floors reported in Table 6.2 are absolute and not relative
as in Figure 6.13. The first three columns of the table represent progressively-larger
sample sizes. A run is a single table of the 192 measurements as discussed previously,
where we make a leakage measurement each time just before we apply one of the
192 shorting and observing configurations. The variation in a run represents the
absolute best-case measurement noise, which we refer to as the instrument noise. A
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set is 6 runs, and contains 6 × 192 = 1152 leakage measurements. A superset is 12
sets, contains 12 × 6 × 192 = 13824 leakage measurements and is what we use to
characterize the measurement noise.
With these definitions in place, we can now make the following observations from
Table 6.2. Without temperature control, the temperature tends to drift over time,
and therefore as we add more measurements to our sample (run → set → superset),
the noise floor tends to increase. The leakage voltage and current measurements have
a noise floor of about 22µV and 244nA, respectively. As more samples are taken, the
noise floor of the leakage voltage increases slightly to 26µV, but the leakage current
increases by an order of magnitude to 3.2µA. This indicates that the leakage current
is more difficult to control. For the short voltage and current, shown in the third and
fourth rows of the table, the run statistics are not available because we single out
a single measurement from the 192 (as discussed previously in reference to Figure
6.10). Furthermore, since there are only 6 numbers on which to do statistics for the
set, the set statistics for the short voltage and current are not very accurate, but are
presented for completeness. However, the superset has 12×6 measurements and is an
accurate measure of the noise level for the short voltage and short current. The signal
column represents the variation in the measurement across the 192 configurations,
and we therefore refer to this as the “signal ceiling”. It is computed exactly like the
superset noise floor for the leakage current and voltage, but it encompasses our “PUF
signal” and therefore represents the maximum signal dispersion. We can compare the
“signal ceiling” with the “noise floor” and produce the final column, labeled signalto-noise ratio (SNR). For the voltage and current, the PUF signal is approximately
75 times and 1,500 times greater than the measurement noise, respectively. Finally,
the last two rows of the table are the Vdrop and Req statistics, which are computed in
a fashion similar to that of the short voltage and current. Similar to the short voltage
and current statistics, the “set” noise floor is based on 6 samples and is therefore not
very accurate. As with the short voltage and current statistics, we have a signal to
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Leak V
Leak I
Short V
Short I
Vdrop
Req

Run
2.2261e-05
2.444e-07

Set
Superset
Signal
2.2379e-05 2.6038e-05
4.8069e-07 3.1901e-06
1.7740e-05 3.545e-05 0.0026441
2.0456e-06 1.598e-06 0.0024963
2.3755e-05 4.1385e-05 0.002647
0.04353
0.03565
4.085

SNR

74.587
1562.1
63.97
114.6

Table 6.2: Noise Levels without Temperature Control

Leak V
Leak I
Short V
Short I
Vdrop
Req

Run
2.5512e-05
2.4164e-07

Set
Superset
2.6348e-05 2.7136e-05
5.4763e-07 9.4091e-07
3.2390e-05 2.7876e-05
7.0103e-07 1.0735e-06
2.988e-05 2.2478e-05
0.034959
0.029169

Signal

SNR

0.0021098
0.0024968
0.002114
4.058

75.686
2325.9
94.03
139.1

Table 6.3: Noise Levels with Temperature Control (25◦ C)

noise ratio which is approximately 64 and 115 for the Vdrop and Req .
Table 6.3 reports the same metrics for the experiment with active temperature
control. It is clear from the first column that the instrument noise floors are approximately the same as without temperature control, as we expect. Specifically, the
leakage voltage and current noise floors are 15% larger and 1% smaller, respectively.
The leakage voltage and current superset noise floors, which represent how well we
are controlling temperature, are 4% larger and 70% smaller, respectively. The short
voltage and current superset noise floors are 21% and 33% smaller, respectively, again
indicating reduced temperature variations. Finally, the signal to noise ratios are all
higher under temperature control. Specifically, the short voltage, short current, voltage drop and equivalent resistance noise floors are 1.5%, 49%, 47% and 21% greater,
respectively.
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Figure 6.10: Voltage and current measured under shorting condition without temperature control (result similar when temperature is controlled)
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Figure 6.11: Vdrop and Req measurement noise with and without temperature control
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Figure 6.12: Mean and standard deviations of various measurements versus temperature
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6.3

Effects on Analog Req and Vdrop PUFs

We expect that the analog PUF values will be affected by temperature, but the
exact relationships were not well understood. As shown in Section 6.1.3, the leakage
current, supply voltage, short voltage and short current are all affected temperature.
In this section, I will explain how the analog PUF parameters, equivalent resistance
Req and voltage drop Vdrop , are affected by temperature, based on new experimental
data using the Thermo-Electric Cooler (TEC) setup.
With the experiment run at four temperature points, 0C, 25C, 50C and 75C, the
resistances and voltages for the various chips at each point can be compiled. I also
collected noise samples, which are repeated runs on a single chip, for two chips in
order to characterize the stability of the measurement. I was forced to only make 6
runs at each temperature point due to the temperature extremes involved and the
risk of condensation. For this noise experiment, the LabVIEW code was modified
to repeat the sweep with 6 runs at the 4 temperature points, and repeat the whole
process 12 times to yield a total of 6 × 12 = 72 runs at each temperature point. After
all the data has been compiled for the various combinations of Req or Vdrop , chips,
temperatures, I continue the analysis in the statistical computing package called R
(http://r-project.org/).

6.3.1

Temperature Effects on Analog PUFs

In this section, I describe how the Req and Vdrop are affected by temperature, using
the 72-point noise sample for C47 o, and how that impacts the performance of the
PUFs. This is a further treatment of the relationship of these parameters with
temperature shown in Figures 6.12 and 6.13 in Section 6.2. The metrics of Chapter
5 are presented for the new temperature-controlled data.
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To characterize this relationship, the first thing I do is average the 72 noise
samples into one value for each resistance or voltage (of 192), and repeat for each
of 4 temperatures. We can then track each of these physical parameters through
the different temperature points. The first issue that presented itself was that the
dispersion between the various analog values on the same chip was much larger than
the variations that I saw due to the change in temperature. This can be readily
seen in the plots of the average values in Figures 6.14. Recall from Section 5.1 that
the magnitude of the equivalent resistance is a function of the number of shorts
that are on. In the figure, the equivalent resistances are scaled into the same range
by multiplying the Req by the number of shorts that are on, which are marked by
different colors. This puts them all around 10Ω for comparison.

6.3.2

Probability Analysis

In this subsection, I will repeat the probability analysis of Section 5.3 with temperature control. In that section, we showed that the addition of the multiple-on
test conditions to the 6 single-on scenarios provide the highest-possible level of information from the device, as well as making the number of CRPs exponential with
respect to the number of hardware resources. Unless specified otherwise, I will use
the 192-dimension vectors from here on.
Recall that in the previous analysis, we computed 192 resistances or voltage
drops and considered this vector comprised of all the CRPs as the signature for

that chip. Then, in order to measure the dispersion, we compute all n2 Euclidean
distances of pairs of these vectors, which is equivalent to an upper-triangular matrix
of distances Di,j . The same distances are computed for the noise sample, and a
histogram is generated for both sets of distances. The histogram serves to illustrate
the distribution, but the original sets of chip and noise distances used directly fit
to a Gamma distribution. Next, we choose a practical upper bound on the noise
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Figure 6.14: 72-point mean Req versus temperature for the 192-values of the noise
sample

distances by finding where the noise CDF is equal to 99.73%, the same area for
the ±3σ interval of the Normal distribution. Then, we apply this threshold to the
CDF of the Gamma fit for the chip distances to decide estimated the probability of
aliasing. For convenience, Table 6.4 reports all of the estimates of the probability of
aliasing we have made previously.
In Figure 6.15, the histograms for all pairwise Euclidean distances of chip (top)
and noise (bottom) vectors at 25◦ C are plotted. I have also plotted the result from
the three other temperature points that we used, 0◦ , 50◦ and 75◦ C. The legend
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Aliasing Probability
Req
−8

DAC2009 Single-on
6.9 × 10
DAC2010 Single-on
4.27 × 10−7
Multiple-on 1.18 × 10−8

1 in 15 M
1 in 2.3 M
1 in 84 M

Vdrop
8.8 × 10
1 in 113 M
2.96 × 10−5 1 in 33 k
1.13 × 10−5 1 in 88 k
−9

Table 6.4: Review of previous estimates of probability. Note: the DAC2010 Vdrop
results were previously unpublished.

indicates the colors that are used for each histogram. It is clear from the figure that
temperature does not have a profound affect on the inter-chip Euclidean distances.
Unlike the inter-chip distances, the noise distances exhibit a noticeable effect of
temperature, as we expect. The black “stair” line shows the 0◦ C case, and the noise
distances are centered about 0.9Ω. However, at the nominal case of 25◦ C, drawn with
a red stair line, we observe a smaller tail to the right-hand side, and the histogram
has more of a Gaussian bell curve. Moving up to 50◦ C, drawn with a green line,
the mean is greater and the standard deviation looks smaller. At 75◦ C, drawn with
a blue stair line, the mean is less but the noise distance are essentially the same as
they are at 50◦ C. Similar observations can be made for the Vdrop analysis, shown in
Figure 6.16.
The thresholds on Euclidean distance for each temperature are also shown with
circles on Figures 6.15 and 6.16, and are drawn with colors corresponding to the
stair line colors. The thresholds are also reported in Table 6.51 . For the Req analysis,
the threshold has a minimum at 75◦ C and appears to be monotonically-decreasing
with increasing temperature. For the Vdrop analysis, the thresholds are again a
monotonically-decreasing series with increasing temperature. Table 6.5 also reports
the probability of aliasing for the various analyses performed. For the analog Req
PUF, room temperature represents the minimum probability of aliasing, at 3.7×10−9 .
1 These

estimates are slightly more pessimistic than our previous estimates because
99.7300204% was used rather than 99.7% to find the noise threshold.
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Req

Vdrop

Temp.
Threshold Probability of Aliasing
0C
0.16762
5.6018 × 10−9
25 C
0.14119
3.7317 × 10−9
50 C
0.13100
1.6358 × 10−8
75 C
0.12825
1.4607 × 10−7
−4
0 C 4.4313 × 10
3.4923 × 10−9
25 C 3.5254 × 10−4
8.5433 × 10−10
50 C 3.0688 × 10−4
3.9388 × 10−10
−4
75 C 2.8414 × 10
9.3278 × 10−10

Table 6.5: Results of probability analysis for various combinations of analog Req and
Vdrop and different temperature points.

For the analog Vdrop PUF, the minimum probability of aliasing is found at 50◦ C to
be 3.9.1 × 10−10 . This analysis addresses the performance of the PUFs in thermal
equilibrium at different temperatures. However, this does not address the issue of
the temperature changing between measurements of the same chip or comparing two
chips at different temperatures.
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Figure 6.15: Histograms of Req vector inter- and intra-chip Euclidean distances
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To evaluate the performance of the PUF when the temperature cannot be controlled, we can “aggregate” the chip and noise samples at nominal temperature
(25◦ C) with the other temperature points. This represents a worst-case scenario
for thermally-induced noise. We do this by simply adding the measurements made
at the other temperature points (0◦ C, 50◦ C and 75◦ C) to the nominal sample. The
effect that aggregating the different temperature points should have is to make noise
distances larger on average, and (possibly) make chip distances smaller, which will
effectively decrease the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR). In the case of inter-chip distances, we cannot simply aggregate the chips at the other temperature points. We
have to take special care when choosing the pairwise combinations. The problem is

that if we just use all n2 combinations, we will end up with a few comparisons of a
chip against itself at another temperature point, which is unreasonable. Therefore,
the pairs of inter-chip distances are chosen such that this case is excluded. Then,
we found that the chip distances in the temperature-aggregated sample were approximately the same as the nominal sample. The first row of Figure 6.17 show the
aggregate chip distance histograms for the Req and Vdrop .
Another problem arises when we aggregate the noise sample for the analog signatures. When we compute the pair-wise noise distances from the aggregated sample,
we observe four distinct modes in the corresponding histogram. These histograms
are shown in the second row of Figure 6.17. These are a result of comparing measurements of the chip at varying temperature differences. Measurements taken at
the same temperature tend to yield one noise distance (which is the same as observed
previously), measurements made at two temperatures that are 25◦ C apart yield a
higher distance, measurements made at two temperatures 50◦ C apart yield an even
higher distance and so on. The four distinct modes are readily observed: same temperature, 25◦ C difference, 50◦ C difference and 75◦ C difference. It is unreasonable
to use the fits shown on the histogram from this analysis in order to measure the
probability of aliasing. In order to estimate a worst-case scenario, we could choose
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the noise distances so that we only compare measurements made between the two
temperature extremes. This would effectively single out the largest mode in the noise
histogram, which is centered at 2.25Ω or 9mV, for the Req and Vdrop , respectively.
The noise distances might then have a Gamma distribution, however it is clear from
the figures that the noise (upper-limit) threshold would be well into the range of most
of the inter-chip distances, and therefore would not yield a reasonable probability of
aliasing (e.g., 50% or 80% could be aliases). Therefore, when temperature cannot
be controlled, it is not feasible to use a threshold on the Euclidean distance between
two chips to determine if they are identical.

6.3.3

Vector Angles

Instead of computing the Euclidean distance between two vectors of analog quantities
that were taken at different temperatures as we did in the previous section, one
possible solution is to use a different metric to compare how different two vectors
are. The effect of temperature on these analog quantities is a scaling effect that
changes the magnitude of the voltage or resistance that we measure proportional to
its magnitude at room temperature. It also tends to affect each of the quantities
in a similar manner. For example, we have seen that an increase in temperature
leads to a decrease in the voltage drop. In other words, changes in temperature
tend to affect the vector’s length, and perhaps not the vector’s angle. Therefore,
if we use angles between the vectors as a means to measure the distance, then the
angles between vectors should be preserved over temperatures. For example, consider
a three-dimensional vector (1, 0.5, 1). If temperature drift were to add 10% to each
term of this vector, then it would be (1.1, 0.55, 1.1). If we compute the angle between
this vector at both temperature points, we would get exactly zero.
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Nominal
Aggregate

Req
Vdrop
Req
Vdrop

Threshold
0.002476
0.002341
0.02193
0.01776

Probability of Aliasing
4.5541 × 10−13
1.7156 × 10−11
4.0587 × 10−3
2.3333 × 10−3

Table 6.6: Results of probability analysis for analog Req and Vdrop , in the nominal
and aggregate case, using vector angles

The formula I use to compute the angle between two n-dimensional vectors is

θ = arccos

a·b
kak kbk


,

(6.14)

which is given by
a · b = kak kbk cos θ.

(6.15)

Essentially, I compute the dot product and then divide by both vector norms. I pass
the result to the inverse cosine function (arccos) to obtain the angle between the
vectors in radians. This applies to vectors of any dimension. Therefore, we can use
this as an alternative to using Euclidean distances to measure the difference between
chips when temperature cannot be controlled.
From Table 6.6, it is apparent that when we use the vector angles, the probability of aliasing actually decreases (improves) over the metrics using the Euclidean
distance shown in Table 6.5. This is because there is a larger dichotomy between the
chip and noise distances. Figure 6.18 shows the histograms of both chip and noise
pairwise distances when we use the vector angles of the 192-term analog vectors, for
the nominal case of 25◦ C. Figure 6.19 show the corresponding histograms when we
aggregate the angles of the vectors for temperatures between 0◦ C and 75◦ C. The corresponding thresholds and probabilities of aliasing are reported in Table 6.6. From
the table, it is clear that aggregating these vector angles results in a probability of
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aliasing that is several orders of magnitude smaller than the nominal case. This indicates that the effect of temperature on each of the terms in the vector is not exactly
the same within a given chip. Otherwise, the probabilities would be approximately
the same, as we will see later when we aggregate the digital signatures. Nevertheless, these probabilities of aliasing are 1 in 246 and 1 in 428, for the Req and Vdrop
PUFs, respectively. In summary, the method provides a worst-case analysis that is
reasonable for the analog vectors.
Another way of assessing this measure of difference between two vectors is to
study the histograms in Figure 6.19. Although the probability of aliasing estimates
are reasonable for both the nominal and the aggregate vectors, there is still a multimodal distribution of the noise distances. This can be seen in the second row of Figure
6.19. The different modes are not as distinct as they are in Figure 6.17, where we used
the Euclidean distance as the measure of difference between the vectors. Instead,
they are more bunched together, indicating that this metric is resisting the changes
between different temperature points, but not eliminating them.
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Figure 6.18: Histograms of nominal (25◦ C) Vdrop and Req vector inter- and intra-chip
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6.4

Effects on Digital Req and Vdrop PUFs

In Chapter 5, we explained how to generate 30- and 255-bit binary response vectors
from the analog data that we measure with our instrumentation. Essentially, we
construct pairs of the analog values and generate a 1 or a 0 depending on their
relative magnitude. As mentioned, this is an operation which can be implemented
on-chip using an operational amplifier, and it therefor models a realistic use scenario.
We consider two methods for constructing a set of pairs of observe locations which we
compare to produce a 1 or a 0. We call these methods “core” and “all”, and represent
the pessimistic and optimistic choices, respectively. In this section, I revisit those
results with the new data that was taken under temperature-controlled conditions.

6.4.1

Function of Temperature

The first analysis we performed helped us understand how the dispersion of the analog
values affected the stability of the bits. In other words, we wanted to understand
the relationship between the proximity of the analog values that are compared to
produce a bit and the likelihood of that bit to change. The bit would change if
one analog value (a resistance or voltage) became larger than the other when it was
previously smaller. We expect that a bit flip is most likely when the analog values
are close to one another.
The bits that we use to construct the 30- and 255-bit binary vectors are selfrelative. If temperature affects the analog values in a common way, then we do not
expect the bits to change between different temperatures. For example, if resistances
Ra and Rb are such that Ra > Rb at 0◦ C, then we expect that the rate of change of
both resistances as a function of temperature is approximately the same and should
not cause Rb ≤ Rb at 25◦ C or even 75◦ C. We observed that the stability of bits was
affected by temperature. In other words, the bits we generate are more likely to flip
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at higher temperatures. Recall that previously, at room temperature, we observed
no bit flips in the case of the core analysis, and we observed bit flips under only the
all analysis. The case was the same for the core analysis with the new data for both
0◦ C and 25◦ C. However, there were some bits that flipped at 50 and 75◦ C. These
metrics are also reported in Table 6.7.
We can also visualize the dispersion of the analog values and how their proximity
affects the stability of corresponding bits with histograms. In Figure 6.20, four
histograms are plotted for the core analysis. On the left-hand side are the histograms
for bits that flipped, and on the left-hand side are the histograms for bits that were
stable. The histograms on the top row correspond to the Req PUF and those on the
bottom row correspond to the Vdrop PUF. In each histogram, four trends are plotted
corresponding to the four different temperature points. The number of samples used
to create the histogram is also indicated in parenthesis in the legend. It is clear that
the number of unstable bits for the core analysis grows as temperature increases,
but for the large majority of cases, the distances are large enough to prevent any
bit flipping (50 out of 2000 cases). Furthermore, the largest distance that tends to
cause a bit to flip is around 0.4% for both the Req and Vdrop PUFs, where most of
the distances are at 1, 3, or 5%. For each temperature point, I have also plotted a
dotted vertical line which represents the measurement noise floor. This shows that
the majority of analog values that cause bits to flip are closer to each other than
the measurement noise floor. In Figure 6.21, the same analysis as above is presented
for the all analysis. The trends are more well-defined since there are many more bit
comparisons involved (approximately 18,100), but the results are similar. Bits start
to flip when the relative difference in the analog quantities gets smaller than the
measurement noise. It can also be seen that as the percent difference gets smaller,
the bit is more and more likely to flip. Finally, any integrated architecture will
have a similar problem with comparing values that are too close to one another, and
therefore this models the performance of an integrated architecture.
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Figure 6.20: Histograms of Percent Differences (100 × (x − y)/x) for core bits that
flipped (left) and bits that were stable (right) for Req (top) and Vdrop (bottom).
Each plot includes the four temperature points between 0 and 75◦ C. The vertical
lines indicate the corresponding measurement noise floor.
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Figure 6.21: Histograms of Percent Differences (100 × (x − y)/x) for all bits that
flipped (left) and bits that were stable (right) for Req (top) and Vdrop (bottom).
Each plot includes the four temperature points between 0 and 75◦ C. The vertical
lines indicate the corresponding measurement noise floor.
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6.4.2

Aliasing Probability

As we learned in Section 6.4.1, the digital signatures are self-relative and therefore
are resistant to changes in temperature that affect the parameters we measure in a
common mode. However, we also saw that the uncertainty of the bits increases as
temperature rises. In this section, I apply a probability analysis similar to that of
Section 6.3, but with a few key differences. First, since the elements in the vectors are
now bits, we use the Hamming distance rather than the Euclidean distance. Second,
because the Hamming distances are now discrete, I will apply the Negative Binomial
Distribution in order to fit the histograms of distances. Recall that the Euclidean
distances were continuous and that we used the Gamma distribution to fit them.
In Figure 6.22, there are two histograms of Hamming distances taken from the
chip and noise samples for the Req PUF, using the “all” construction. The black
stair line is for the nominal temperature of 25◦ C, and the red line is for the aggregate
(0 - 75◦ C) analysis. The top histograms are for inter-chip distances and the bottom
histograms are for the noise (intra-chip) distances. As we reported earlier, the average
chip distance is approximately 121, half the code length of 255 bits. As we expect,
nearly 40% of the noise distances are zero in the nominal case. About 30% are 1-bit
differences, and the remaining 30% are two bits or greater. Next, we “aggregate”
the nominal sample with other temperature points as we did before in Section 6.3.2.
The aggregate trends are drawn with red stair lines in Figure 6.22. In the case of
the noise aggregate sample, adding the vectors from these other temperature points
just exacerbates the noise that we see. This is reflected in the histogram, which
shows that the average noise distance has increased from about 2.0 to about 3.8
bits. Finally, Figure 6.22 shows the corresponding histograms for the Vdrop PUF.
The results are almost identical.
As with the analog analysis, the threshold chosen for each noise histogram is
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Core
(30-bit)

Nominal
(25◦ C)
Aggregate
(0-75◦ C)
All
Nominal
(255-bit) (25◦ C)
Aggregate
(0-75◦ C)

Req
Vdrop
Req
Vdrop
Req
Vdrop
Req
Vdrop

Probability
Threshold of Aliasing
1 2.64 × 10−3
1 3.40 × 10−3
3.2 1.87 × 10−2
3.2 2.24 × 10−2
7.5 2.07 × 10−7
7.5 2.98 × 10−7
13 6.18 × 10−6
13 8.50 × 10−6

Mean
Chip
14.3
14.3
14.3
14.3
121
121
120.7
120.7

Mean
Noise
0
0
0.554
0.554
2.00
2.00
3.78
3.78

Table 6.7: Results of probability analysis of digital PUF signatures for various
combinations of Req and Vdrop , core and all, and nominal temperature (25◦ C) and
aggregate (worst-case) over 0◦ C and 75◦ C

indicated with circles ◦ on both plots, in the appropriate color. The thresholds are
also reported in Table 6.7. The probability of aliasing for each analysis is the next
column in the table. It is clear from Table 6.7 that the Req PUF fairs slightly better
than the Vdrop PUF, as was the case with the analysis of the analog values. The
worst-case analysis degrades the probability of aliasing by an order of magnitude
(e.g., 2×10−7 down to 6×10−6 for Req all). This is an excellent result that indicates
that although temperature does have an effect, the digital PUFs are still viable when
temperature cannot be controlled.
Another point of reference that can be used in conjunction with the probability of
aliasing is the theoretical upper bound on the number of distinct signatures, which
is 2−N , where N is the number of bits in the signature. For our 30-bit core and
255-bit all signatures, these bounds are 9.31 × 10−10 and 1.73 × 10−77 , respectively.
However, the number of independent bits and the number of independent responses
is not ideal in practice. From Table 6.7, we can compare the probability of aliasing
with these upper bounds. For the core analysis, we are seeing approximately 1×10−3
out of 1 × 10−10 . For the all analysis, we are seeing approximately 1 × 10−7 out of
1 × 10−77 .
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6.4.3

Hamming Distances

Many publications comment on the average of the inter-chip and noise (intra-chip)
Hamming distances, and using the separation between the two to qualify the power of
the PUF to distinguish chips. We have given estimates of the probability of aliasing
whenever possible, which is more quantitative than the mean distances alone, but it
is important to use the same metrics that have become standard. In this section, I
comment further on the distances computed for Figure 6.22.
The average inter-chip Hamming distance, which is simply the average number
of bits between two chips, is ideally 50%. You can easily convince yourself of this
by considering an average distance that is greater than 50%, such as 100%. In that
case, all the bits would be different between two chips and you would quickly find
that there are only two signatures with one the logical complement of the other. In
Chapter 5, we reported that the average inter-chip Hamming distances was 48.0%
and 48.5% for the core and all constructions.
The mean chip and noise distances are reported in the last two columns of Table
6.7, since these are metrics used by others [50]. The mean can also be reported as a
percentage of bits, which can be found by dividing the mean by the number of bits
in the signature—30 bits for core and 255 bits for all. These metrics are reported in
percent bits for convenience in Table 6.8. Recall that the ideal inter-chip Hamming
distance is 50% and the ideal noise (intra-chip) distance is 0%. For example, the
authors of [50] report that these metrics are 46.15% and 0.48%, respectively, for their
PUF. The “core” and “all” analyses were essentially identical under these metrics
both at nominal and aggregate temperature. The mean chip distances in percent
are 47.6% and 47.5%, respectively, and the mean noise distances in percent are
0% and 0.78%, respectively. When we aggregate temperature, these metrics decay
somewhat. In the core analysis, the chip mean remains essentially the same, but the
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Mean
Chip
Core Nominal
47.6%
Aggregate 47.6%
All
Nominal
47.5%
Aggregate 47.3%

Mean
Noise
0%
1.85%
0.784%
1.48%

Table 6.8: Mean inter-chip and noise Hamming distances, reported in percent bits

noise distance increases from 0% to 1.8%. In the all analysis, the mean chip distance
decreases slightly to 47.3% and the noise distance increases to 1.5%.
For completeness, Figure 6.23 are the histograms corresponding to Figure 6.22, for
the “core” binary signature construction. The trends are not as readily seen, however,
since there are very few bits in the signature. Recall there are only 30 bits per chip,
and up to 25 of these bits are dependent upon the first 5. In the first row of Figure
6.23, it can be seen that the number of chip distances that have a zero Hamming
distance (far-left bin) is non-zero. In other words, some chip signatures under the
“core” construction were exactly the same. Specifically, 1.7% and 2.1% of the Req
and Vdrop distances, respectively, have a zero distance. Upon inspection, 5 and 8
of our chips out of 36 are aliases under the 30-bit core Req and Vdrop construction,
respectively. This is expected, however, since we are trying to distinguish 36 chips,
and in general we have at least 5 bits in the signature that are truly independent.
Therefore, the lower bound on the number of distinct signatures is 25 = 32, which is 4
fewer than the number of chips we considered. To resolve this issue, we could increase
N from 6 to something much greater. For example, if we have 100 SMCs, then the
number of bits would then be 100 × 99 = 9900 (see Section 5.5), and presumably at
least 100 independent bits.
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Figure 6.22: Histograms of Hamming distances for chip and noise samples for the
Vdrop and Req PUFs, using the “all” construction
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6.4.4

Bit Probabilities

In this section, I report the single-bit probability and bit flip probability metrics, as
defined by the authors of [41]. We commented on these metrics in Chapter 5 (also
DAC2010) for the Req PUF. The single-bit probability is a metric of the quality of
each bit, akin to the fairness of a coin, and is ideally 1/2 = 50%. If each bit is
like a fair coin, then the maximum randomness is achieved in general. We reported
50% for both the core and all analyses in Chapter 5. The bit flip probability, the
probability of a bit to flip between measurements, is ideally 0%. This characterizes
the reliability or repeatability of that bit of the PUF. We reported 0%2 and 0.644%
for the core and all analyses, respectively.
The single-bit and bit-flip probabilities are reported in Tables 6.9 and 6.10. From
Table 6.9, all of the single-bit probabilities are less than 4% away from the ideal
50%. There is no definite trend of the single-bit probability with temperature, so it
is robust to changes in temperature. Finally, the “all” signatures all have a single-bit
probability less than 50% and the “core” signatures all have a single-bit probability
that is greater than 50%. Moving on to the bit flip probabilities (Table 6.10), it
can easily be seen that they are all small—less than 3%. As was the case with our
experiments without temperature control (for DAC2010), at 0◦ C and at 25◦ C, the
“core” signatures had no bit flips from which to take statistics. However, for 50◦ C
and 75◦ C, we see that there are up to 2.7% bits that flip on average. As we have seen
before, the core analysis doesn’t give us enough samples to observe definite trends,
but there is a trend from the all analysis. For both the Req and Vdrop “all” signatures,
there is a minimum bit flip probability at room temperature (25◦ C), and show an
increasing trend at both colder and hotter temperatures.

2 There

was not enough data to find a single bit flip in this case.
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Temp (C)
0
25
50
75

All
Req
47.57081
46.97168
46.75381
46.42702

Core

Vdrop
47.29847
46.73203
46.48148
46.22004

Req
52.87037
52.31481
51.75926
52.03704

Vdrop
52.87037
52.50000
51.94444
52.12963

Table 6.9: Single-bit probabilities for binary signatures (ideally 50%)

Temp (C)
0
25
50
75

All
Req
Vdrop
0.9912854 0.9368192
0.6644880 0.6644880
1.0729847 1.0511983
2.2712418 1.4760349

Core
Req
Vdrop
0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000
2.592593 2.685185
2.546296 1.435185

Table 6.10: Bit flip probabilities for binary signatures (ideally 0%)

6.5

Observe Net Leakage Current

One of the realities that we have abstracted away in the discussions before this point
is that the voltage observe transistors suffer from sub-threshold leakage. For example,
this means that if we want to enable one out of six observe transistors, that five are
leaking current into the grid that constitutes the voltage sense wire. In this section,
I describe how this leakage current affects the accuracy of our measurements of the
voltage drop, which in turn impacts the equivalent resistant that we compute.
In fact, we have 4,000 observe transistors in our chips. We found that this sourceto-drain leakage current significantly affects the observe voltage that we record. Figure 6.24 shows a circuit diagram that represents a voltage observe measurement.
The 900mV power supply is represented as a voltage source Vsupply and the shorting
transistors are represented by a current source Ishort . Req in the figure is the true

118

Chapter 6. Temperature Effects

+ 0.9V
−

Vsupply

Igrid
Ileak

Rpara
Robs

Vobs

+
−

I =0

Ileak

Req
Mobs
Ishort =Igrid +Ileak

Figure 6.24: The observe transistor physical circuit view

equivalent resistance of the power grid, which we cannot measure exactly due to this
problem. The current Ishort , represented by a current source, is drawn through this
resistance. At the same point that the shorting current is drawn, the voltage observe
transistor, labeled Mobs is attached. On the other end of the transistor, the voltage
sense wire net is represented. The voltage sense wire net is a grid that connects all
4,000 observe transistors to the voltage observe pin. To model this with an equivalent circuit, we insert a resistance both before and after the point where the leakage
current Ileak enters the net. The voltmeter instrument draws practically no current,
so the resistance on the left-hand side has practically no voltage drop, and therefore
no effect on the observe voltage. However, the leakage current injected by the other
observe transistors, represented in Figure 6.24 by Rpara , does flow over the resistor
on the right-hand side, labelled Robs and through the voltage sense transistor. Since
the current is flowing from left to right through the resistor Robs and the observe
transistor, the voltage decreases along the same path. This means that the voltage
we measure with the voltmeter represented as Vobs is elevated above the ideal level.
This current Ileak finally becomes a component of Ishort , which is the global current
that we measure.
From Figure 6.24, we can write the following equations using KVL and Kirchhoff’s
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Current Law (KCL).
Vsupply = Igrid Req − Robs Ileak + Vobs

(6.16)

Ishort = Igrid + Ileak

(6.17)

The terms Igrid , Req and Robs are all unknown and Mobs is assumed to be an ideal
short for now. In a separate experiment, we can drive the Vobs voltage instead of
using it as a volt meter. We can them simulate the voltage drop that the shorting
current and observe transistor will create across the observe net and measure the
leakage current Ileak that is pulled across the 4,000 transistors. However, this is only
a first-order approximation because the voltage drop we use to stimulate the observe
grid is based on the Vdrop measurement as presented previously, which we know know
is not accurate. From Equation (6.17), Igrid = Ishort − Ileak . Then I can eliminate the
Igrid term from Equation (6.16), which we cannot measure, and I have
Vsupply = (Ishort − Ileak )Req − Robs Ileak + Vobs .

(6.18)

Now, I have one equation and two unknowns, Req and Robs . To overcome this, I
can write Equation (6.18) for multiple temperature points, and use the appropriate
known values for each temperature. I model unknown resistances as a function of
temperature using Equation (6.1), repeated here for convenience,
R = Rref [1 + α(T − Tref )].

(6.19)

I use the α = 0.001394, from the metal characterization experiment in Section 6.1.1,
and Tref = 25◦ C. Then each unknown resistance is a function of the reference resistance Rref and the independent variable temperature T . After substituting Equation
(6.19) into Equation (6.18) for Req and Robs , I can write one equations at 25◦ C and
another at 50◦ C. I then solve for Req, ref and Robs, ref .
Based on preliminary measurements, Req, ref = 10.62Ω and Robs, ref = 1640Ω. I
can then compute the voltage drop across Robs which I call Vobs, para and adds to our
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measurement of Vobs . From the circuit diagram, Vobs, para = Ileak Robs . Therefore, at
25◦ C and 50◦ C, Vobs, para = 825µV and 1.407mV, respectively. The true voltage drop
across the equivalent resistance of the power grid is then
Vdrop, corrected = Vsupply − (Vobs − Vobs, para )
= Vsupply − Vobs + Vpara .

(6.20)
(6.21)

The corrected equivalent resistance is then
Req, corrected =

Vsupply − Vobs + Vpara
.
Ishort − Ileak

(6.22)

Using this information, I created the trends in Figure 6.25. The first curve in the
figure represents one of the equivalent resistances that we have shown so far. Then,
the corrected equivalent resistance is plotted in red. It is clear from this graph
that our first-approximation of this non-ideal leakage current into the observe net is
substantial enough to cause the NTC to become a Positive Temperature Coefficient
(PTC). This effect is an unfortunate reality and it inversely affects our measurement
of the voltage drop and equivalent resistance. However, it fortunately explains why
the equivalent resistances are not behaving like copper, a metal with a PTC.
There are several solutions to this problem. For example, the observe transistors
could be sized to reduce the amount of leakage current. It is known that scaling the
length of a transistor by a factor of 2 can reduce the leakage current by a factor of 10
[49]. Alternatively, we’re only proposing using 6 SMCs, not 4,000. If fewer observe
transistors are present, then the total leakage current and corresponding impact on
the measured voltage would be more ideal.
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Figure 6.25: Original and corrected equivalent resistance versus temperature
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Future Work
The experiments and results presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide affirmation
of the feasibility of the proposed PUFs. However, there is still plenty of work to
be done. In this chapter, I discuss goals for work that still needs to be done and I
describe plans to implement those goals. I first present extensions to the hardware
primitive in Section 7.1. This primitive will support measuring process variations in
the power distribution network, the analog PUFs and also the integrated architecture.
The integrated architecture is reviewed and detailed again in Section 7.2. Then, in
Section 7.3, I also present an alternative integrated architecture which may also be
fruitful in a design. Finally, in Section 7.4, I discuss some short-term goals.

7.1

Extensions to Hardware Primitive

We plan to investigate one extension to the PUF architecture that will increase
the number of single-on scenarios, as shown in Figure 7.1. The new SMC includes
additional “voltage sense transistors” that connect to the upper metal layers so that
the voltage at any layer, e.g. M1 through M10, can be sensed. This will improve
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Figure 7.1: SMC with multiple sense transistors for different metal layers

the accuracy of the measurement of the supply voltage at the chip, and remove
any variation introduced by the power supply wiring and the chip package. This
also provides n VDrops and ERs (n as shown in the figure) to be measured from
each SMC. FF2 through FF5 drive the inputs to a 4-to-16 inverting decoder which
functions to produce a single ‘0’ on one of the voltage sense transistors when driven
with a specific binary pattern. The decoder is connected such that an input bit
pattern of all ‘1’s disables all voltage transistors.
We have added this decoding logic to minimize the additional hardware overhead
of this SMC architecture. Assuming these modifications triple the size of the PUF
circuitry to 150µm2 , this still only represents 0.06% of a 5mm × 5mm chip that includes 100 copies of the SMC. Also, the SMC leakage current is negligible since the
stacked transistors in the shorting inverter are both off, and there is no voltage drop
across the voltage sense transistors, when the SMCs are not being used. Last, each
SMC may be able to provide up to 10 times the number of response bits compared
to the original scheme and therefore, fewer copies will be needed to achieve a specific
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size for the response bit space.
This extended SMC architecture allows any pairing of VDrops or ERs from two
different PUFs to be compared. However, in an actual use scenario we must constrain
the use of quantities from only the same layer in order to maintain an even singlebit probability. This restriction is necessary because the VDrops and ERs should
increase monotonically across the vertical dimension of the power grid.
As we did in Section 5.2, we will again explore comparing VDrop and ER differences instead of recording the individual absolute values. As with our current
hardware, we can measure the absolute values and compute the differences by simply by subtracting the two. For example, as shown in Figure 7.1, we can measure 10
absolute VDrops/ERs but only 9 differences in these values. We believe that the differences will capture the random variations better and tend to reject environmental
variations. We will evaluate the results of the per-layer analysis against the standard
PUF metrics as discussed in Chapter 5.

7.2

Integrated Architecture

The PUF as proposed requires the use of external instrumentation to measure the
voltages and global currents needed to compute the PUF responses. Although this
approach serves the chip authentication application well, e.g. where the objective is
to periodically check the authenticity of chips to circumvent attempts to replace the
chips with conterfeits, it is not amenable to remote authentication or cryptography
applications that use the PUF responses as secret keys in encryption/decryption
algorithms. In order to serve this latter need, the PUF responses need to be computed
using entirely on-chip instrumentation.
The simplest approach to accomplishing this goal was discussed in Section 4.1
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and shown in Figure 4.3. In the integrated architecture, the objective will be to
design a well-balanced operational amplifier and a “scan chain”1 controller. In Figure
7.2, the diagram shown in Figure 7.1 has been extended to support the integrated
architecture. This circuit is essentially the same as that shown in Figure 7.1, but uses
a larger decoder and has the voltage observe transistors replicated for use with the
second voltage sense net. The OpAmp connects to the two globally-routed voltage
sense wires so that we can decide which voltage is greater. In our prototype, we will
also connect these two voltage sense wires to pins so they can be interfaced with two
off-chip voltmeters, as shown in the figure. Recall that the purpose of the scan chain
controller will be to accept requests in some binary format, drive the scan chain
through a sequence of configurations and produce a binary response. Encryption
or obfuscation of the CRPs can also be implemented with the microcontroller. The
primary constraint on the controller will be to occupy the least amount of area
possible, since response time is not really critical.

7.3

Integrated Architecture with an ADC

We have also considered an alternative implementation of the integrated architecture
mentioned so far. Instead of having two voltage sense wires and an operational
amplifier that compares the two, we can use a single voltage sense net that connects to
an Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC). The calibration of this ADC will be critical
to the function of the PUF, but it can be used to convert the voltage into, for example,
3 bits that represent voltages from 800mV to 900mV. Then we can cycle the system
through all of the single-shorting configurations and produce N 3-bit numbers. Using
these 3-bit numbers, we can perform a simple binary-integer subtraction and decide
1 The

scan chain implemented won’t be as complete as a standard scan chain definition
such as JTAG. The scan chain in this case is essentially a shift register used for configuration.
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Figure 7.2: Extension of SMC primitive shown in Figure 7.1 to support two voltage
sense wires.

which one is larger. This is exactly the process we are performing off-chip with more
precision. However, this is by no means the only scheme that could be used. For
example, the 3N bits could be randomly permuted (rearranged) and then XORed
(exclusive or) with 3N challenge bits. Then, the result could be the response.
As well as supporting implementing the PUF on-chip, this architecture also supports the use of absolute difference between the two integers as a metric to decide
if the bit will be “reliable”. For example, if two voltages were less than 2 steps
apart, we could label them as “unreliable”. The micro-controller could issue an error
code, indicate “equal to” rather than “less than” or “greater than” in the response,
or pursue an alternative method of producing the bit that would be more reliable.
There are other proposed methods for improving the reliability of PUFs over different operational points such as temperature. The authors of [38] proposed one
way to do this is to allow two groups of values (such as ring oscillator frequencies)
instead of just two values and pick the pair from the two groups that maximizes
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the absolute difference. For example, assume we can measure two sets of voltages
(865, 809, 843, 889)mV and (836, 899, 880, 849)mV. The pair consisting of one voltage
from each set that maximizes the absolute difference is (809, 899)mV, and 809 < 899
produces a 0. Then, we can use the second term of each group whenever comparing
the groups, and the probability of a bit flip is greatly reduced. However, the cost of
this scheme is that only 1/4 of the hardware is being utilized. A scheme such as this
one could easily be incorporated into our integrated architecture.

7.4

Short-term Goals

We have been approved for a 3mm × 3mm chip which we plan to tape out January,
2011. We plan to target the following objectives using a Process Development Kit
(PDK) from IBM for a 90nm bulk technology. The two components I will build will
be integrated into an IC which will be a larger group effort supported in part by the
National Science Foundation (NSF).
The SMC primitive shown in Figure 7.1 will be designed and layed out.
The OpAmp and PUF Controller shown in Figure 4.3 will be designed and
layed out. We can then take the IC through the parasitic extraction phase using
the IBM Monte Carlo process models for the purposes of functional and timing
verification. This can also be used to simulate a population of ICs. From this virtual
population, we can simulate the performance of the integrated architecture without
getting silicon back. Optionally, we plan to test up to 40 chips. Although the
simulated statistical analysis should track well with results from actual ICs, this is the
ultimate proof-of-concept. Completion of this objective will depend on the arrival
time of the chips. A statistical analysis similar to that performed in previous
chapters should follow.
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In Chapter 1, I identified the need to measure process variations in sub-micron technologies and introduced the problems that Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
address in hardware security. I described some of the facets of PUF design such as
weaknesses and how they are interfaced. I then outlined the rest of the document.
In Chapter 2, discussed other work that studies process variations and physical
unclonable functions. I described the applications and implementation techniques
that have been proposed for PUFs. I also give a summary of various PUF metrics
that are used to evaluate the quality of a PUF.
In Chapter 3, I presented a method to model and measure Power Distribution
System (PDS) resistances. This infrastructure can be used to characterize BEOL
resistance variations during process bring-up and debug. It can also serve as a
process monitor to track variations over time. The embedding of the infrastructure
in the context of the actual circuit rather than test structures in isolation increases
the relevance of the resistance analysis that it provides. The results of the analysis of
resistance variations on two sets of chips fabricated in a 65nm technology illustrates
that BEOL variations can be significant (Section 3.6). The proposed infrastructure
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can help reduce delays in manufacturing development and yield learning cycle times
caused by BEOL resistance variations.
In Chapter 4, I proposed a PUF that leverages the inherent resistance variations
in the metal layers that constitute the power grid. Data from a set of thirty-six chips
fabricated in a 65nm technology is used to confirm the feasibility of this strategy. The
results show that the responses of the analog PUF, using both equivalent resistance
(ER) and voltage drops (VDrops), possess a high degree of randomness and stability.
I also described a way to integrate the voltage drop PUF on-chip while requiring
minimal hardware overhead, which I refer to as the integrated architecture.
In Chapter 5, I proposed the addition of “multiple-on” scenarios and investigated several quality metrics of the same PUFs that were defined in Chapter 4.
The multiple-on scenarios yielded an exponential number of Challenge/Response
Pairs (CRPs) with respect to the number of Stimulus/Measurement Circuits (SMCs)
and also improved the probability of aliasing for the analog PUFs to 36 times the
probability considering only the single-on scenarios. I also emulated the integrated
architecture proposed in Section 4.1, by comparing two ERs or VDrops on the same
chip to produce bits. Since it uses differences in values, it is therefore a “differential”
PUF. The results show that the responses of this differential PUF possess a high
degree of randomness and stability. The analysis also revealed that the single-bit
probability of the response bits, and the inter-chip and noise Hamming distances
are near ideal. However, the increase in entropy is small for response vectors that
include data from the 2-on, 3-on, etc. tests, and the usefulness of enabling more than
approximately 6 SMCs simultaneously is therefore limited.
In Chapter 6, I added temperature control to the system in order to more deeply
understand the measurements I was making. I described the configuration of the
Thermo-Electric Cooler (TEC) and the Negative Temperature Coefficient (NTC)
thermistor I used for feedback. I characterized a special resistor on the chip as a
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function of temperature, which served later as a reference point for the Temperature
Coefficient of Resistance (TCR) of other resistors. I described the theory beyond
my temperature control mechanism which I used to bring the system to thermal
equilibrium at different temperatures. In Section 6.2, I presented a thorough characterization of the measurement noise. The noise was treated in progressively larger
samples, which allowed me to characterize everything from the baseline instrumentation noise to the worst-case noise where temperature drift became an issue. It was
shown that temperature control, although not perfect, improved the stability of the
temperature of the devices at nominal temperature. The effect of temperature on
measurements such as leakage current and transistor “on” current were presented,
along with the associated relative noise floors. In Section 6.3, I presented a new
analysis of the analog PUFs. I described how the voltage drops and equivalent resistances were affected by temperature and presented a new estimate of the probability
of aliasing at each of the temperature points I used. The aliasing probability tends
to vary with temperature, but the analog PUFs can still be used at any temperature point. The concept of the “aggregate” temperature analysis was presented, but
did not provide a meaningful worst case for the analog PUFs. In order to remedy
this problem, I suggested the use of vector angles as an alternative measure of the
difference between analog vectors in Section 6.3.3. I showed that this measure is
more resistant to temperature-induced changes than the Euclidean distance. In Section 6.4, a new analysis of the digital PUFs, which simulate the performance of an
integrated implementation, was presented. It was shown that bits that are unstable at room temperature tend to become more unstable when temperature varies,
but stable bits are resistant to variations in temperature. I also observed that the
bits that tend to flip are already near or below the noise floor of the corresponding
measurement. The probability of aliasing was estimated, and it was shown that
when temperature cannot be controlled, the probability of aliasing gets worse only
by an order of magnitude. The digital PUF is therefore resistant to temperature
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variations. Other standard metrics such as inter-chip and noise Hamming distances,
single-bit probability and bit flip probability were estimated again, and were shown
to be near-ideal, regardless of the temperature. Finally, in Section 6.5, I presented
an analysis of a reality of the test chips that adversely affects the accuracy of the
measurement of on-chip voltage. This inaccuracy accounted for the NTC that I was
seeing associated with the “equivalent resistances” that I compute and use as a PUF.
In Chapter 7, I described the many facets of future work on this subject. I
presented my ideas for extending the hardware primitive to allow more-accurate
characterization of Back End-of-Line (BEOL) process variations by providing more
measurements. Extensions of the hardware primitive will also support an advanced
PDS PUF that is both more accurate and will have many more CRPs. I also proposed
an alternative PUF implementation that uses an Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC)
and lends nicely to integer arithmetic to decide things such as the “reliability” of a
bit in the response. Finally, I set forth a list of my short-term goals.
In summary, the theory of this PUF that leverages variations in the power grid
that is already present on every IC was presented. The concepts of measuring resistance alone and leveraging variations in the power grid are both novel. I am grateful
for the opportunity to present this work two years in a row at the Design Automation
Conference (DAC), and receive constructive criticism in the form of both peer reviews and questions at the end of the presentation. There have also been more than
one commercial interests. The parametric study of the PUF at different temperature
points was much more interesting than I expected. I was able to discover things that
are invisible from a single temperature point. Overall, the analysis shows that the
PUF exhibits near-ideal performance under the standard PUF metrics, making it an
attractive PUF implementation.
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Following are tables that represent the 192-valued signatures from a few of the
chips we measured. The values are listed from left to right and from top to bottom.
The first 6 numbers are from the single-on scenario, and the next 30 are from the
2-on scenario, and so on. See Table 5.1 for a complete enumeration. Only the first
two chips are included for brevity.
Table A.1: Chip ER signature for chip 1
9.68
5.35
4.91
3.88
3.84
3.98
4.00
3.85
3.18
3.16
3.16
3.14
3.15
2.74
2.80
2.92

9.55
4.90
5.12
4.06
4.02
3.57
3.94
3.74
3.33
3.25
3.29
3.28
2.97
2.87
2.64
2.83

9.86
5.46
5.27
3.98
3.67
3.71
4.07
4.15
3.25
2.97
2.92
3.04
3.10
2.81
2.89
2.79

8.85
4.78
5.68
3.88
3.87
3.96
3.87
3.95
2.92
3.08
3.34
3.34
3.39
2.55
2.73
2.56

8.95
5.49
5.38
4.05
3.98
3.61
3.60
3.68
3.16
3.28
3.17
3.15
3.25
2.65
2.84
2.66

10.22
4.88
5.54
3.55
3.72
3.76
4.17
4.09
3.31
3.23
3.25
3.24
2.94
2.74
2.57
2.90

5.27
5.27
5.41
3.91
4.00
3.84
3.98
3.94
3.24
2.92
2.95
3.06
3.07
2.86
2.67
2.46
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5.49
5.05
5.66
4.01
3.94
4.02
3.55
3.72
3.02
3.05
3.38
3.37
3.36
2.81
2.90
2.56

5.34
5.38
4.89
3.59
3.66
4.08
4.11
4.15
3.16
3.16
3.28
3.27
3.23
2.54
2.73
2.51

5.51
4.93
5.72
4.03
3.87
3.88
3.97
3.62
3.29
3.31
3.24
3.22
2.96
2.89
2.80
2.31

5.46
5.41
5.05
3.96
3.63
3.98
3.59
3.78
2.94
3.25
2.92
3.03
3.09
2.73
2.58
2.40

5.39
5.03
5.68
3.54
3.77
4.13
4.16
4.18
3.06
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.39
2.86
2.68
2.60
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Table A.2: Chip ER signature for chip 2
7.94
4.50
4.94
3.41
3.35
3.36
3.43
3.30
2.81
2.76
2.78
2.77
2.74
2.44
2.56
2.47

8.12
4.94
4.80
3.47
3.39
3.65
3.60
3.52
2.86
2.91
2.82
2.80
2.99
2.48
2.54
2.46

8.73
4.58
4.47
3.62
3.51
3.56
3.43
3.39
2.96
2.99
2.98
2.91
2.94
2.56
2.47
2.56

8.97
4.97
4.57
3.39
3.33
3.53
3.33
3.35
2.98
2.92
2.81
2.81
2.82
2.60
2.42
2.60

8.26
4.85
4.54
3.43
3.54
3.65
3.63
3.54
2.79
2.81
2.77
2.75
2.78
2.55
2.45
2.57

8.10
4.98
4.61
3.64
3.51
3.57
3.41
3.41
2.84
2.94
2.93
2.91
3.00
2.45
2.60
2.48

4.57
4.42
4.82
3.36
3.40
3.38
3.38
3.52
2.95
3.00
2.98
2.91
2.95
2.49
2.56
2.20
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4.62
4.71
4.62
3.57
3.57
3.41
3.64
3.55
2.90
2.94
2.82
2.82
2.83
2.57
2.46
2.24

4.55
4.50
4.95
3.64
3.53
3.40
3.43
3.42
2.77
2.81
2.83
2.81
2.90
2.59
2.40
2.30

4.86
4.75
4.63
3.44
3.30
3.36
3.56
3.65
2.81
2.85
2.95
2.94
3.00
2.46
2.54
2.34

4.65
4.75
4.75
3.61
3.63
3.56
3.65
3.57
2.99
2.96
2.99
2.93
2.95
2.43
2.60
2.31

4.92
4.75
4.56
3.66
3.54
3.41
3.43
3.44
2.93
2.82
2.83
2.83
2.84
2.48
2.56
2.23

Appendix B
Code Statistics
A large part of the time that was invested into this work went into things outside of
this document. To name a few, I spent a lot of time in meetings where I received
constructive criticism, many hours working in the laboratory and managing the experiments. However, the largest fraction of time was spent working on code and
computing statistics. Below I list some statistics on the codes that were developed
to answer all the questions we had about the PUF.
Language Files

Lines

R

17

1,575

7

1,286

Perl

I used Subversion to manage the files for the analysis. There were over 40 revisions
to the code that was developed for the chapter on temperature effects alone. I ran
over 38 different experiments in the lab, since we had a sample of 36 chips and we
collected several noise samples. This presented a great opportunity to learn R, which
was foreign to me when I got started. Without the results from this infrastructure,
this research would not have been possible.
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